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NEWBORN HIV SCREENING AND NEW YORK
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 6747-B:
PRIVACY AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
PREGNANT WOMEN
I. Introduction
Since its earliest reported cases, already thirteen years ago,' the
onslaught of the terminal condition known as acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has been relentless. Its worldwide
cost cannot be understood through statistics alone; neither the
thousands of human lives it has ended 2 nor the millions3 it has
made hopeless fully measure its toll. The AIDS epidemic is doubly
fearsome: as it destroys lives and families and defies our medical
capacity to provide a cure, it also strains our social capacity to re-
spond to it fairly and effectively. As an ongoing and escalating pu-
bic health disaster, AIDS remains misunderstood, its victims
routinely mischaracterized and mistreated. Beyond the profound
injury of the condition itself, AIDS victims struggle under the
heavy weight of prejudice and fear. As it eludes the best hopes of
science and medicine,4 AIDS therefore raises a host of troubling
legal, political, and ethical questions that leave society and its insti-
tutions wanting for answers.
Proposed New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B5 attempts to an-
swer one of the most urgent problems of the current HIV/AIDS 6
1. The first cases of what came to be called AIDS were reported in California in
June of 1981. The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First Ten Years, MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 7, 1991, at 357 [hereinafter The First Ten Years].
2. As of June 1991, over 113,000 persons were reported to have died of AIDS.
This represented almost two-thirds of the total reported cases. Id. at 359. AIDS is the
second leading cause of death among men aged 25-44 and the fifth leading cause of
death among women aged 15-44. Id. at 357.
3. The World Health Organization estimates that 8 to 10 million adults and one
million children worldwide are HIV infected. Id. By the year 2000, 40 million per-
sons may be infected with HIV. Id.
4. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, HIV Negatives: AIDS Still Immune To the Onslaught
of Medical Science, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, § IV, at 1.
5. N.Y. A.B. 6747-B (1993). The pertinent language of the bill can be found
infra, part III.
6. The term "HIV/AIDS" is not used here to describe a specific medical condi-
tion, but rather to indicate the complicated spectrum of infection which begins with
the HIV virus and ends with full blown AIDS. HIV infection can have a variety of
debilitating outcomes, of which AIDS is the ultimate. The virus can be carried for
years with no manifest symptoms, or decline can be precipitous. For a more thorough
treatment of the complex medical dimensions of AIDS and HIV infection, see PAUL
ALBERT ET AL., AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL (3d ed. 1992); MICHAEL CLOSEN ET AL.,
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epidemic: pediatric AIDS.7 The fierce and well-publicized debate
it has engendered exposes not only our medical and social short-
comings in responding to the epidemic, but the legal and ethical
dilemmas it has created as well.8
Pediatric AIDS is a particularly compelling target for legislative
action for two reasons. First, children are typically perceived as the
most innocent and helpless-and least threatening-of the dis-
ease's victims.9 Second, this subset of the epidemic is among its
fastest growing. 10 By the year 2000, twenty million children will be
affected by HIV/AIDS." In the United States, urban areas are at
the center of this explosion.12 New York, which accounted for one-
third of all pediatric AIDS cases in the 1980's, reported 1,395 cases
THE AIDS NUTSHELL (1990). The term HIV/AIDS as used in this Note is therefore
meant to indicate both the medical and social realities of this "spectrum disease." See
Ann Kurth & Margaret Hutchison, Reproductive Health Policy and HIV: Where do
Women Fit In?, 1 PEDIATRIC AIDS AND HIV INFECTION: FETUS TO ADOLESCENT 121
(1990).
7. Pediatric AIDS was first recognized in 1983. Gwendolyn B. Scott et al., Sur-
vival in Children with Perinatally Acquired Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I
Infection, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1791 (Dec. 28, 1989). Initially associated with gen-
eral symptoms such as failure to thrive and various recurrent infections, both bacterial
and opportunistic, HIV infection in children is now recognized as manifesting a broad
array of clinical diseases in multiple systems. Id.
8. See, e.g., Peter Hellman, Suffer the Little Children: The Rising Storm Over the
Law that Keeps HIV-Positive Newborns from Early Detection and Treatment, N.Y.
MAG., Feb. 21, 1994, at 26-32; AIDS Babies Pay the Price, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993,
at A26 (editorial); Infant's Rights: Give HIV Test Results to Mothers, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
June 10, 1993, at 46 (editorial).
9. For example, Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn, the leading proponent of
Bill No. 6747-B, has opined that "[c]hildren are the silent, most vulnerable victims of
AIDS." James Dao, Bill Offered on Requiring AIDS Report, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
1994, at B6.
10. A Review of Epidemiologic Trends in HIV Infection of Women and Children, 1
PEDIATRIC AIDS AND HIV INFECTION: FETUS TO ADOLESCENT 11 (1990). Whereas
95% of adult infection arises from voluntary behavior, pediatric HIV infection is
thrust upon the infant. Id. An implicit appeal of treating pediatric AIDS is protecting
the welfare of uninfected children attending school with and interacting in the com-
munity with the infected children.
11. This estimation includes ten million children the World Health Organization
projects to be infected with HIV, and another ten million children who will lose one
or both parents to AIDS. The First Ten Years, supra note 1, at 357.
12. Eighty-four percent of the pediatric AIDS cases in the United States occur in
metropolitan areas with at least 500,000 people. Hermann Mendez & Jose Ernesto
Jule, Care of the Infant Born Exposed to Human Immunodefiency Virus, 17 OBSTET-
RICS & GYNECOLOGY OF N. AMER. 637 (1990). Through the 1980's, New York City
accounted for nearly one-third of pediatric AIDS cases nationwide. See New York
State Seroprevalence Project, 81 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 10-11 (May 1991) (special
supplement devoted to the New York seroprevalence testing program) [hereinafter
NY Seroprevalence Project].
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through 1993-87% of these in New York City.13 These figures are
expected to increase dramatically in the near future.'4
Bill No. 6747-B would respond to pediatric AIDS by mandating
HIV testing for all babies born in the state and requiring disclosure
to all mothers whose babies test positive. 15 The bill's proponents in
the legislature, as well as pediatricians, children's rights advocates,
and others, argue that advances in medical treatment 16 that im-
prove and prolong the quality of life of HIV-infected children jus-
tify an involuntary testing and disclosure mechanism. 17
But the proposal has met serious opposition. 8 Most of this op-
position is predicated on a peculiar feature of current newborn
testing techniques: results are actually a more accurate indicator of
13. Report of the Subcommittee on Newborn HIV Screening of the New York State
AIDS Advisory Council 5 (Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Newborn Screening Subcom-
mittee Report].
14. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
15. See Mireya Navarro, Testing Newborns for AIDS Virus Raises Issue of
Mothers' Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al; Dao, supra note 9, at B6. The
program currently in operation in New York state also provides for mandatory testing
of newborns, but it is done anonymously and only for purposes of epidemiological
research and efficient allocation of resources. See infra part III.A. When the term
"mandatory testing" is applied to mothers in this Note, the author is referring to the
affect of the bill and not its means. Testing would not actually be done directly on the
mother. Instead sample blood (containing maternal antibodies) is drawn from the
infant, as is done under the current program, but the results therefrom are indicative
of the mother's status. See id.
16. Discussed infra part IVA.2.d.
17. See Dao, supra note 9, at B6; see also Dissenting Comments on the Jan. 31, 1994
Report of the Subcommittee on Newborn Screening to the AIDS Advisory Council
(Feb. 4, 1994).
18. The history to date of Bill No. 6747-B is as follows. In June of 1993, Assem-
blywoman Nettie Mayersohn introduced the bill to the New York State Assembly.
Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 1. Her proposal was ta-
bled, in a 10-9 vote, by the Assembly's Health Committee that month, see Navarro,
supra note 15, at 44, pending the research and recommendations of a subcommittee to
be appointed by the New York State AIDS Advisory Council. Newborn Screening
Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 1. The Newborn Screening Subcommittee
formed thereafter held five public meetings and a public hearing between September
and December of 1993. Id. at 2. On February 10, 1994, the 24-member Newborn
Screening Subcommittee voted, with four dissenters, to reject the proposal, advocat-
ing "strongly encourage" voluntary testing instead. See id. at iii. The AIDS Advisory
Council adopted the subcommittee's recommendations on Feb. 24, 1994. See Mireya
Navarro, New York AIDS Panel Encourages Doctors to Test Pregnant Women, NEW
YORK TIMES, Feb. 25, 1994, at Al. Disregarding these recommendations, a bipartisan
group of state legislators pressed ahead with Bill No. 6747-B on March 7. See Dao,
supra note 9, at B6. As of the middle of April, the bill was still in Committee, with a
vote expected later in the Spring. Id. More recently, a competing proposal, which
stresses mandatory counseling and voluntary testing, has been introduced. Kevin
Sack, Bill to Require HIV Counseling for Pregnant Women Gains in Albany, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1994, at B5.
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the mother's HIV status than the child's.19 When a newborn tests
positive, it means that the mother is HIV-infected, because the vi-
rus and its antibodies have been transferred to the newborn from
the mother through the placenta sometime during pregnancy.2 °
The effect of the bill, therefore is to impose mandatory HIV testing
on all parturient 2' women. Currently, there is no compulsory HIV
testing in New York for anyone, although federal law provides for
testing without consent of federal prisoners, military personnel,
and job corps applicants.22 Bill No. 6747-B would therefore require
amending Article 27-F of the New York Public Health Laws,23
among the strictest AIDS confidentiality statutes in the United
States. Put in effect on February 1, 1989, Article 27-F requires in-
formed, written consent for any HIV-related test. Informed con-
sent must be both preceded by personal counseling and followed
by further post-test counseling.24
Although mandatory testing and disclosure to parturient women
raises numerous legal problems, 25 the focus of this Note is limited
to the possible infringement of the mother's constitutional rights to
privacy and equal protection. Bill No. 6747-B cannot withstand a
challenge brought under either Fourteenth Amendment aegis.
Well-intentioned, the bill is nevertheless an unconstitutional ma-
nipulation of pregnancy as an occasion for invidious, unconstitu-
tional governmental intervention.26
19. See Dao, supra note 9, at B6; Navarro, supra note 15.
20. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for a medical description of this
process.
21. "Parturient" in this sense means "of or pertaining to giving birth." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 906 (2d ed. 1991).
22. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 23.
23. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. 27-F (McKinney 1992).
24. Id. § 2781(1) ("A physician or other person authorized pursuant to law to or-
der the performance of an HIV related test shall certify, in order for the performance
of an HIV related test, that informed consent required by this section has been re-
ceived prior to ordering such test by a laboratory or other facility.").
25. Among the legal arguments not addressed in this paper are other constitu-
tional issues such as the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure protection and the
Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process protections; federal issues such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act; state issues of confidentiality, disclosure, and
consent (touched on tangentially), and the Family Court Act; criminal sanctions; and
various tort issues such as the duty to disclose, duty to third persons, and child ne-
glect. For a comprehensive treatment of the numerous areas where AIDS and the law
intersect, see ScoTr BURRIS ET AL., AIDS LAW TODAY (1992).
26. A constitutional analysis of this issue is particularly important because there
are 42 other states (plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia) which operate
testing programs similar to that currently in place in New York. See J.P. Getchell et
al., HIV Screening of Newborns, 49 BIOCHEM. MED. & METABOLIC Bio. 143, 145
(1993). Each of these states and territories runs a program similar to New York's, in
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Part II of this paper briefly discusses the medical background of
pediatric AIDS and HIV infection, particularly the epidemiology
of HIV/AIDS in women and children. Part III describes New
York's current HIV screening program and compares it to the
changes proposed under Bill No. 6747-B. Part IV examines privacy
issues, specifically infringement of the discrete rights of confidenti-
ality and autonomy, and concludes that both are violated by the
bill. Part V, focusing on gender and pregnancy discrimination,
presents an equal protection argument likely to be raised against
the proposal, and concludes that the bill violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as well. An alternative proposal-combining fully
funded counseling and routinely recommended voluntary testing
tied directly to family-oriented, follow-up care-is suggested in
Part VI. In conclusion, this Note urges the New York State Assem-
bly to reject Bill No. 6747-B, in light of its substantial and unconsti-
tutional infringement of the rights of childbearing women and its
inability to justify that infringement on medical or public policy
grounds.
IH. HIV Epidemiology in Women and Children
A. Women and HIV/AIDS
Because of its origins and early epidemiological profile,27 AIDS
is commonly perceived as an affliction of gay and intravenous drug
using men. This lingering perception impedes progress against the
disease and must be changed to reflect reality. AIDS only appears
monolithic. In fact, the epidemic has splintered into diverse grains
of society, threatening unforeseen segments of our population.
Most significantly, "[t]he burden of [HIV] disease is shifting away
from white males toward minority women. '28 The implications of
this shift are profound: AIDS is now a serious threat to women,
particularly to women of reproductive age and women of color,
and to their babies. Despite the grave impact of this shift, women's
needs are rarely the focus of public policy, prevention, research or
that they are "unlinked," or anonymous, programs designed to trace and respond to
the spread of HIV. See infra note 64. Passage of Bill No. 6747-B may encourage
these states to enact similar mandatory testing and disclosure programs, thus directly
affecting a large portion of our population.
27. For a general discussion of the natural history of AIDS, see The First 10 Years,
supra note 1.
28. Mindy Tinkle et al., HIV Disease and Pregnancy: Epidemiology, Pathogenesis,
and Natural History, 21 J. OF OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSEs 86
(Mar./Apr. 1992).
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treatment.29 Three trends, however, dictate a need to refocus med-
ical and societal views of AIDS and women.
First, women constitute the fastest growing subpopulation of the
HIV epidemic.30 Between 1985 and 1990, the incidence of AIDS in
women in the United States nearly doubled;31 between 1989 and
1990 alone, AIDS cases in women increased by 34%.32 These wo-
men primarily contract HIV infection in one of two ways: having
intercourse with an HIV-infected man or using intravenous drugs
with a contaminated needle.33 Indeed, women are four times as
likely as men to contract HIV through heterosexual intercourse.34
Second, AIDS has a disproportionate impact on reproductive
age women. It is the fifth leading cause of death among young
women, and the number one cause of death among women age 20
to 40 in New York City.35 Women in this age group constitute 77%
of the female AIDS population.36
Third, AIDS has a similarly disproportionate impact on women
of color,37 particularly African-American and Hispanic women in
29. Joelle S. Weiss, Controlling HIV-Positive Women's Procreative Destiny: A
Critical Equal Protection Analysis, 2 SETON HALL'CONST. L.J. 643, 647 (1992)
30. Id. at 646-47. Between 1983 and 1990 the number of-reported AIDS cases in
women in New York increased 24 fold (from 174 to 4,194). NY Seroprevalence Pro-
ject, supra note 12, at 19.
31. AIDS Rate Among U.S. Women Nearly Doubled in Five Years, AIDS POL'Y &
L., June 26, 1991, at 9. The figures increased from 6.6% to 11.5%. Id.
32. Tinkle, supra note 28, at 87. As of December of 1991, there were 21,225 re-
ported AIDS cases among adult women in the United States. Arlene Butz et al.,
HIV-Infected Women and Infants: Social and Health Factors Impeding Utilization of
Care, 38 J. OF NURSE MIDWIFERY 103 (Mar./Apr. 1993) (special issue). AIDS is the
eighth leading killer of women in the United States. Tedd V. Ellerbrock et al., Epide-
miology of Women with AIDS in the United States, 1981 through 1990 a Comparison
with Heterosexual Men with AIDS, 265 JAMA 2971 (1991). It is further estimated
that 140,000 women are infected with HIV, U.S. Public Health Service National Con-
ference: Women and HIV Infection, CLINICAL COURIER, Aug. 1991, at 1. Other esti-
mates put that figure as high as one in every 800 women. Martha Field, Pregnancy
and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402, 406 (1993).
33. Sheldon Landesman, HIV Infection in Women: An Overview, SEMINARS IN
PERINATOLOGY, Feb. 1989, at 2. While most infections occur through contaminated
needles (51%), a rising number occurs through heterosexual transmission (33%).
Tinkle, supra note 28, at 87. The Newborn Screening Subcommittee puts this figure at
75%. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 5.
34. Mary E. Guinan & Ann Hardy, Women and AIDS: The Future is Grim, 42
JAMA 157 (1987).
35. Butz, supra note 32, at 103.
36. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. 12 (Aug. 1991).
37. Almost 83% of women with AIDS are also women of color; 52% Afro-Ameri-
can and 30.6% Hispanic. Newborn Screening Committee Report, supra note 13, at 5.
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poor urban neighborhoods. 38  A minority female is more than
twice as likely than a white woman to become HIV-infected.39 In
1988, AIDS killed African-American women at nine times the rate
it killed white women.4° Nationally, it remains the number one
killer of African-American women;41 in New York City, AIDS is
the leading killer of Hispanic women. 2
B. Newborns and Vertical Transmission
The shift in AIDS demographics has bleak implications for ur-
ban minority children. Because perinatal transmission (from the
mother to the fetus or infant) accounts for 93% of pediatric AIDS
cases, 43 the spread of HIV-infection among newborns mirrors its
spread among childbearing women. The number of reported cases
of pediatric AIDS has increased dramatically: between 1982 and
1991, only 3,199 cases were reported to the CDC;' today, it is esti-
mated that 1,500 to 2,000 HIV-infected children nationwide are
born every year.45  This surge in HIV-infected children, tied indi-
rectly to the explosion in intravenous drug use in inner cities, is
expected to "skyrocket" even further.46
As merciless as it is in adults, AIDS is even more brutal in
newborns, who have not had the time to develop protective antibo-
dies before their immune system is assaulted by HIV.47  When in-
38. Weiss, supra note 29, at 649 ("[T]he demographic distribution of HIV-infected
women highlights stark geographic, ethnic, and economic patterns."). "At present,
the group of persons diagnosed with HIV spectrum disease who die the fastest are
women with AIDS, especially urban, low-income black and latina women." Kurth &
Hutchison, supra note 6, at 121.
39. Butz, supra note 32, at 103.
40. AIDS in Women-United States, 265 JAMA 23 (1991).
41. Vicki Alexander, Black Women and HIVIAIDS, SIECUS REP., Dec. 1990-Jan.
1991, at 8.
42. Miguelina Maldonado, Latinas and HIV/AIDS Implications for the 90s,
SIECUS REP., Dec. 1990-Jan. 1991, at 11.
43. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 5.
44. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 9. Over half of these children
have already died. Id. at 13.
45. Center for Disease Control, Special Report,- Pediatric HIV Infection on the In-
crease, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, July 1991, at 2 [hereinafter Pediatric HIV Infection].
46. Weiss, supra note 29, at 653 (noting a projected increase of 10,000-20,000 cases
in the United States in the next few years. The World Health Organization has esti-
mated a fifteen-fold increase, from 700,000 in 1990 to 10 million in 2000); Peter
Lamptey & William R. Finger, The Next AIDS Crisis: Babies Born with HIV, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 30, 1990, at A31. Pediatric AIDS is already the ninth leading killer of
children between one and four. Pediatric HIV Infection, supra note 45, at 2.
47. Tinkle, supra note 28, at 88. In adults, the common opportunistic, AIDS-de-
fining diseases include pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), candidiasis of the
esophagus and lungs, persistent fulminating herpes simplex infection, cytomegalovirus
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fection strikes, it is fast and ruthless, manifesting itself in one or
several opportunistic diseases. 8 The younger the child is when
symptoms appear, the shorter the survival period.4 9 The median
age for presenting with symptoms of HIV infection is 8-9 months.50
The average survival time after diagnosis is nine months, with 90%
dying within five years and one-fifth within a year.51
Ninety-three percent of the children who develop pediatric
AIDS acquire the virus perinatally,52 through "vertical transmis-
sion"-the passing of HIV from mother to child.53 Vertical trans-
mission can occur before birth (via intrauterine infection), during
birth (via exposure to contaminated blood during delivery), or pos-
sibly after birth (via breastfeeding).54 In 1990, 87% of all pediatric
AIDS cases began with prenatal, in utero HIV infection.5 5 Never-
theless, much remains unknown about vertical transmission, in-
cluding a way to prevent it.5 6
in organs other than the liver, spleen, or lymph nodes; toxoplasmosis of the brain;
disseminated tuberculosis; Kaposi's sarcoma; and lymphoma of the brain. Id. at 90
(citations omitted). Pediatric AIDS does not include Kaposi's sarcoma, but PCP is
particularly deadly in children. The manifestation of HIV infection in children in-
volves multiple organ systems, progressive clinical deterioration, and severe immune
dysfunction; opportunistic infections and secondary cancers follow; opportunistic in-
fections include chronic parotitis, lymphocytic interstitial pneumonitis, and serious re-
current bacterial infections (meningitis, pneumonia, osteomyelitis, septic arthritis,
septicemia). Mendez & Jule, supra note 12, at 638.
48. See generally, Scott et al., supra note 7 (discussing these diseases and the aver-
age rates of infection and survival).
49. Id. at 1791.
50. Id.; see also Mendez & Jule, supra note 12, at 638.
51. See A Review of Epidemiologic Trends in HIV Infection of Women and Chil-
dren, in 1 PEDIATRIC AIDS AND HIV INFECTION: FETUS TO ADOLESCENT 11 (1990).
52. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 5. For a thor-
ough, recent synopsis of routes of vertical transmission, see Richard R. Viscarello et
al., Is the Risk of Perinatal Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Increased
by the Intrapartum Use of Spiral Electrodes or Fetal Scalp pH Sampling?, 170 AM. J.
OBSTET. GYNECOLOGY 740 (1994).
53. See generally Peggy Weintrub et al., Use of Polymerase Chain Reaction for the
Early Detection of HIV Infection in the Infants of HIV-Seropositive Women, 5 AIDS
881 (1991); Marguerite Pappaioanou et al., HIV Seroprevalence Surveys of Childbear-
ing Women-Objectives, Methods, and Uses of the Data, 105 PuB. HEALTH REPS. 147
(Mar./Apr. 1990) [hereinafter Objectives, Methods, and Data].
54. The exact nature and magnitude of the dangers of breastfeeding by HIV-posi-
tive women are not well understood. See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
55. Pediatric HIV Infection, supra note 45, at 2; see Vicki M. Mays & Susan D.
Cochran, Issues in the Perception of AIDS Risk and Risk Reduction Activities by Black
and Hispanic/Latinas Women, 43 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 949 (1988).
56. An important new finding, however, has revealed a breakthrough in the pre-
vention, or the deterrence, of perinatal HIV transmission. See Lawrence K. Altman,
In Major Finding, Drug Curbs H.I.V. Infection in Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1994, at Al. A federally financed study conducted in France and the United States
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Although all children who are born to HIV-positive women will
test positive for the virus immediately after birth, only 25% will in
fact turn out to be actually HIV-infected, the remaining three-
fourths will "seroconvert" by shirking off their mothers' antibodies
while presenting none of their own. What occurs in utero is the
transfer to the child, through the placenta, of the mother's antibo-
dies and possibly the virus itself.58 Thus, the only certain indication
of a positive newborn test is that the mother is infected. There is a
window period of approximately twelve months when it is impossi-
ble to tell which infants are truly infected and that are presenting
maternal antibodies which will later disappear in an otherwise
healthy baby.59 During this window period, perhaps the most accu-
rate description of these babies is "antibody-positive. ' 60  New
has revealed that AZT, the drug previously most successful in treating the symptoms
of adult AIDS and HIV infection, can successfully prevent transmission of the virus
from infected mothers to newborns. Id. The CDC has called the finding one "'of
major public health importance.'" Id. In the study, 26% of the HIV-infected
newborns whose mothers were treated with a placebo during pernancy were infected,
whereas only 8% of those newborns whose mothers were treated with AZT were
infected. Id. at A13. Medically, the impact of this finding is enormous. Since HIV-
infection is incurable, the best course is to prevent pediatric AIDS by blocking trans-
mission. Legally, however, this finding will only shift the terms of the debate. Instead
of focusing on post-natal testing and medical intervention, the focus will be on prena-
tal testing. In terms of Bill No. 6747-B, the finding would seem to undermine its
utility. If AZT can prevent pediatric AIDS, or a high percentage of cases, govern-
mental efforts should be focused on prenatal counseling and voluntary testing rather
than after-the-fact compulsory testing. For a discussion of the legislative impact of
this breakthrough, see infra part VI.
57. TWenty-five percent is at the top end of the currently accepted transmission
risk rates. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 9. Because
so little is known about vertical transmission, and because transmission rates vary
from country to country and state to state, there are divergent estimates of the verti-
cal transmission rate. See Mendez & Jule, supra note 12, at 638 (20-40%); Tinkle et
al., supra note 28, at 28 (25-35%); Weintrub, supra note 53, at 881 (25-60%); Antonio
V. Sison & John L. Sever, HIV-1 Infections in Pregnancy and Perinatal Transmission
of HIV-l: Current Issues, 3 PEDIATRIC AIDS & HIV INFECTION: FETUS TO ADOLES-
CENT 5 (1992) (15-30%; 12.9%).
58. Mendez & Jule, supra note 12, at 645-46.
59. Id. at 646. The window period frustrates the usefulness of the proposed testing
procedure because immediate identification of the infant as antibody positive does
not indicate an affirmative course of action, it only alerts vigilant health care provid-
ers to the possibility of infection. The inadequacy of current testing techniques has
prompted considerable research, as scientists work to discover new methods or im-
prove existing ones. The most promising hope for a test that more accurately and
more quickly reflects the true status of the neonate is the polymerase chain reaction
test. See Tinkle et al., supra note 28, at 89. Further frustrating both this effort and the
New York proposal is the sparsity of knowledge about vertical transmission in gen-
eral. See generally, id.; C. Everett Koop, Inaugural Editorial, in 1 PEDIATRIC AIDS
AND HIV INFECTION: FETUS TO ADOLESCENT 7 (1990).
60. Kurth & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 121.
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York's current testing program circumvents the uncertainty of the
window period by tracking only the rates of transmission of the
mother's antibodies, thus casting a wide net over high-risk areas
rather than targeting specific infants for acute care.
III. New York's Current Testing Program and Bill No. 6747-B'S
Proposed Changes
A. New York's Current Testing Program
New York was one of the first states to cooperate with a national
seroprevalence 6' testing program initiated in 1987.62 The ser-
oprevalence program is designed to trace and predict the epidemi-
ological trends of HIV infection in New York in order to
implement more effective strategies for dealing with the AIDS epi-
demic. 63 The state already tested for seven inherited metabolic dis-
orders, using a heelstick blood sample taken from the infant.64
Piggybacked on routine testing, HIV screening necessitated no
61. Serologic testing, first developed in 1985, detects the presence of HIV-1 an-
tibodies in the blood. Neil J. Hoxie et al., HJV-1 Among Childbearing Women and
Newborns in Wisconsin, WisC. MED. J., Nov. 1990, at 627. Seroprevalence refers to
the per capita rate at which the AIDS virus is found in the blood samples of a given
population group.
62. Forty-two states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, and 39 metropoli-
tan areas participate in an ongoing HIV "national sentinel surveillance system" oper-
ated under the auspices of the Center for Disease Control. Marguerite Pappaioanou
et al., The Family of HIV Seroprevalence Surveys: Objectives, Methods, and Uses of
Sentinel Surveillance for HIV in the United States, 105 PUB. HEALTH REP. 113, 113
(1990); see also J.P. Getchell et al., supra note 26, at 143. Known as the "CDC family
of HIV seroprevalence surveys," this system enlists the assistance of state and local
health departments, federal agencies, blood collection agencies, and medical research
institutions in an effort to assist health officials in allocating resources and developing
strategies for HIV prevention and health-care programs. Pappaioanou, supra at 113-
14. For a definitive account of the New York seroprevalence project, see NY Ser-
oprevalence Project, supra note 12. For a technical account of HIV epidemiologic
surveillance surveys, see generally Objectives, Methods, and Data, supra note 53.
63. New York's willingness to undertake the seroprevalence project is understand-
able: it leads the nation in AIDS reporting, with nearly 30,000 cases (resulting in
18,239 deaths) through March 31, 1990 representing almost one-fourth of all cases
nationwide; of these, 84% are New York City residents; in New York City, AIDS is
the number one killer of males 30 to 49, the number one killer of females between 20
and 39, and the number two killer of males between 20 and 39; statewide there were
648 cases of pediatric AIDS as of March 31, 1990, accounting for almost a third of all
cases in the United States. See NY Seroprevalence Project, supra note 12, at 10-11.
64. See id. at 12. These disorders include phenyketonuria (PKU), congenital hy-
perthyroidism, and maple sugar urine disease. See Objectives, Methods, and Data,
supra note 53, at 149. Five other "window" groups were also selected for blind HIV
screening: prisoners, family planning clinic clients, runaway and homeless adoles-
cents, sexually transmitted disease clinic clients and intravenous drug users. See NY
Seroprevalence Project, supra note 12, at 9, 12.
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newly invasive procedures. Unlike routine testing, however, HIV
screening is "blinded," meaning all personal identifiers are re-
moved from the blood sample except the age of the mother, the
race/ethnicity of the infant, and the zip code of the hospital.65 This
information is linked to the test result through a mutually assigned
random number fed through a data base.66
Most importantly, the seroprevalence program operates within
the strict parameters for the confidentiality of AIDS information
established by Article 27-F.67 Because the program is primarily a
research device, with no means of accessing confidential informa-
tion, it necessitates neither the informed consent nor counseling
services required by Article 27-F.
The results of the New York program dramatically confirm the
shift of the AIDS epidemic to urban, minority, reproductive-age
women.
68
* The overall seroprevalence rate in New York State was
.66%,69 or more than eight times higher than the national me-
dian of .08%, with a New York City rate of 1.24%.70
* In some zip code areas, as many as 1 in 22 childbearing
women were HIV-infected.71
* 87% of the seropositives in the state and 89.3% in the city
were African-American or Hispanic. 72
* Nearly 90% of all pediatric AIDS cases were African-
American or Hispanic.73
e The sharpest increase over this period was in young wo-
men: the 14-year-old seroprevalence rate was .16% (1 in 624);
by age 24, it jumped to 1.41% (1 in 71). 71
B. Changes Proposed by Bill No. 6747-B
Assembly Bill No. 6747-B would amend Article 27-F and change
the goals and the methods of New York's current testing program.
The goal of tracking the demographic profile HIV infection would
65. See NY Seroprevalence Project, supra note 12, at 9, 12.
66. Id. at 15.
67. See supra notes 23-24.
68. The study covered 96.3% of all births in New York from November 30, 1987
through March 31, 1990. NY Seroprevalence Project, supra note 12, at 9.
69. This rate has since dipped to 0.59%. Id. at 7-8.
70. Id. at 16, 20.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 56.
74. Id. at 16.
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be replaced by the goal of maximizing treatment opportunities for
infants who are antibody-positive. The current anonymous testing
procedure would be replaced by a mandatory testing and disclo-
sure formula.
The wording of Bill No. 6747-B, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Section 1. Section 2782 of the public health law is amended by
adding a new subdivision 10 to read as follows:
The department shall disclose to the mother ... of a new-
born child confidential HIV related information obtained
as a result of any testing done for any purpose whatsoever
on such child ....
Proponents of the bill argue that the current New York ser-
oprevalence program does not go far enough to protect children
born to HIV-infected mothers and that insistence on anonymity ig-
nores the baby's "right to survive. '76 The bill's primary sponsor,
Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn of Queens, asserts that it is
medically and ethically unjustifiable not to inform a mother that
her child has tested positive simply to preserve her own right to
privacy. 77 Maternal privacy is said to be subordinate to the new-
born's right to life-prolonging treatment, or if the newborn is not
actually infected, to its right not to become inadvertently infected
by an uninformed mother who transmits HIV through her
breastmilk. 78 The infant beneficiaries of Bill No. 6747-B can there-
fore be divided into two groups: the one-fourth of positive
newborns who actually are infected and could therefore benefit
from acute care, and the remaining three-fourths of newborns who
75. Bill No. 6747-B, which originally called for disclosure to both parents, also
provides for disclosure to prospective adoptive parents, to officials of agencies having
the care, custody or guardianship of the child, and, in cases where the mother "cannot
be located," to the father or guardian of the newborn. These provisions raise substan-
tial legal issues-primarily in terms of the privacy of the mother and the infant and
the biological family-and policy issues (providing the best opportunities for adop-
tion and care within overburdened child resources facilities) that are beyond the
scope of this Note but nevertheless would also undermine the effectiveness of the bill.
See e.g., Navarro, supra note 15, at 44; D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genea-
logical Veil: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related
Information in Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REV. 681 (1992). Recent changes made in Bill
No. 6747-B also provide for (1) five million dollars to provide assistance to newborns
testing positive and their family, "provided that the commissioner of health is author-
ized to transfer and deposit this amount," and for (2) grants to be made to programs
serving HIV infected children and their families,"within amounts available therefor."
N.Y. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 6747-B, §§ 3-4.
76. Nettie Mayersohn, It's A Baby, Not A Statistic, Stupid, NEWS FROM ASSEM-
BLYWOMAN NETTIE MAYERSOHN, at 2 (July 1993).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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only test positive and should therefore avoid inadvertent infection
after birth via breastfeeding.
Although Bill No. 6747-B has been popularly publicized as an
"unblinding" of the current seroprevalence screening program,79 it
is really an entirely new mechanism. "Unblinding" the current
program means not that women will have the opportunity to find
out about their status, but that they will have no choice but to do
so. Under this unprecedented proposal, a newborn will be tested
as it currently is, only the personal identifiers will not be stripped
from its blood sample. When the results become available, the
mother who returns with her child for pediatric care will be con-
fronted with them.
IV. The Right to Privacy and Mandatory Testing and
Disclosure
The right to privacy is an elusive constitutional freedom.80 It is
frequently traced to "the right to be let alone."' 81 More recently,
the United States Supreme Court has enunciated the right to be
free from "unwanted governmental intrusions into one's pri-
vacy,"" and "unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters...
fundamentally affecting a person."83 In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,84 a recent case which signaled a new and as yet unclear di-
79. See id.; see also AIDS Babies Pay the Price, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993, at A26
(editorial); Infants Rights: Give Test Results to Mothers, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 10,
1993, at 46 (editorial).
80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court in Roe, acknowledged the difficult line-drawing implicit in carving out a right to
privacy when he wrote that "[tihe Constitution does not explicitly mention any right
of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as... (1891), the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id. (emphasis added).
81. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890)
(borrowing the phrasing of T. Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888)). This phrase was most memorably used by Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v.
United States, when he wrote that the Founding Fathers "conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). However often it is cited by courts and commentators as an early echo of the
constitutional right to privacy, the privacy alluded to by Warren and Brandeis actually
speaks not to the Constitution but to principles of tort law. Nevertheless, in Olm-
stead, it could be argued that Brandeis, obviously aware of this distinction, consciously
imported this concept of privacy into the constitutional domain.
82. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
83. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
84. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (stating that the Constitution limits the state's right to
interfere with an individual's most basic decisions about family and parenthood).
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rection in the Court's jurisprudence on this issue, privacy was
broadly described in terms of "substantive liberties"' that should
not be subjected by the state to an "undue burden. '8 6 No matter
how it is described, privacy is rooted in the doctrine of modern
substantive due process 7 -the Court's recognition of constitu-
tional safeguards against state infringement of certain fundamental
freedoms.8 8
Two distinct strands within the right to privacy have been identi-
fied.89 The first, less controversial strand is confidentiality, or the
85. Id. at 2808.
86. Id. at 2819.
87. See, 2 RONALD R. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL (1986); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, § 15-1 (2d ed. 1988). For a criticism of this doctrine, see, Thomas I.
Emerson, Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court adopted a substantive due process doctrine
when it began to recognize the right of privacy as a protected "liberty" interest under
the clause. This doctrine has since been used to invalidate federal and state legislation
that infringes privacy on the basis of the legislation's substance rather than its proce-
dure. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (family and parenthood); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (family and parenthood); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (childbearing); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (noting "a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter," and which is not restricted to the express rights of the Bill of Rights nor to
those private practices protected at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification).
88. See CAsS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. VI: Implied Funda-
mental Rights, § F, Modern Substantive Due Process: Privacy, Personhood, and Fam-
ily, at 908. In 1923, with Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, and in 1925, with Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, the Court formally began an expansive reading of
Constitutionally protected, but unenumerated, liberties. "[T]he "liberty" guaranteed
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyers, 262 U.S. at 393;
see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (1798) (arguing a theory of natural law in
which "[tihere are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which
will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.")
(Chase, J., dissenting); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1823) (J.
Bushrod Washington) (describing a broad range of interests which are "fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments.").
89. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Nixon v. Adm'r of Services,
433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977); see also Blair, supra note 75, at 688; Gretta J. Heaney, The
Constitutional Right of Informational Privacy: Does it Protect Children Suffering from
AIDS?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 929 (1986).
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"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."'
The second strand, recently revisited by the Court in Casey, is au-
tonomy, or "independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions." 91 At least until Casey, autonomy issues have tradition-
ally been subject to strict scrutiny analysis, which requires that any
governmental action infringing on a fundamental right be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.92 In contrast,
confidentiality issues have traditionally received a less stringent
balancing test analysis, which weighs the state interest advanced
against the personal infringement incurred.93
Although most analyses of mandatory HIV testing focus solely
on confidentiality, 94 a testing scheme predicated on a woman's de-
cision to give birth implicitly burdens her autonomous decision-
making as well.95 Therefore, both tests are applied below.
90. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
91. Id. at 599-600.
92. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 433 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court had held that regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be
narrowly tailored to express only the legitimate state interest at stake.") (citations
omitted). Strict scrutiny is also applied under an Equal Protection analysis to classifi-
cations on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin. See Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1978) (race, alienage, and national origin are suspect classifica-
tions); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 314, 316 (1944) (applying the "most rigid
scrutiny" to the internment of Japanese-Americans in California during World War
II).
. 93. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977). A balancing test avoids the "severity" of strict scrutiny and the "leniency"
of rational relationship test. Heaney, supra note 89, at 945. A balancing test may also
avoid the "political arbitrariness" of determining a "compelling" state interest and
thereby "allows the government to perform its functions effectively while safeguard-
ing the sanctity of vital privacy interests." Id. at 945-46.
94. See, e.g., Heaney, supra note 89; Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of
HIV Blood Test Results to the Individuals Tested: A Matter of Personal Choice Ne-
glected, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 445 (1991); Steven Eisenstadt, An Analysis of the Ration-
ality of Mandatory Testing to the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public
Health Interests with the Individual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. PiTr. L. REV. 327 (1991).
For an comprehensive and recent treatment of the confidentiality of HIV-related in-
formation, focusing particularly on new threats to three levels of protection-statu-
tory protection of HIV-related information, statutory protection of medical
information, and constitutional and common law privacy rights-and suggesting ways
in which they can be reinforced against the current trend of aggressive public health
intervention, see Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information:
Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS
Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 113 (1994).
95. See infra part III.B. (discussing autonomy).
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A. Confidentiality: Weighing the Scope of the Intrusion against
the Interests Advanced
1. Privacy Denied: A Constitutional Balancing Test
Clarifying both confidentiality and autonomy precedent, Whalen
v. Roe 96 expressly recognized both strands as elements of constitu-
tionally protected privacy.97 Whalen addressed a New York statute
that required that the names of persons using certain prescription
drugs be recorded with the State.98 Physicians and patients who
challenged the statute argued that disclosure to the State of pri-
vate, medical information both violated their confidentiality and
deprived them of their right to acquire, use, or dispense such medi-
cations.99 The Court weighed the individual's interests in nondis-
closure and autonomy against the State's "broad latitude in
experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local
concern,"'1 before finding that the statute did not "pose a suffi-
ciently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitu-
tional violation."''
Later in the same term, in Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services,02 the Court reiterated Whalen's recognition of the indi-
vidual's interest in non-disclosure and formally enunciated the bal-
ancing test introduced in the earlier case. Under this test, the
purpose of the challenged statute and the public interest served by
it must be weighed against the scope and extent of its intrusion on
individual privacy.' 0 3
Although a balancing test is necessarily a "delicate task of
weighing competing interests,' 0 4 several criteria have emerged
96. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
97. Id. at 598-99. ("The cases sometimes characterized as protecting "privacy"
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions.") (footnotes omitted).
98. 429 U.S. at 589.
99. Id. at 602.
100. Id. at 597.
101. Id. at 600. Whalen is distinguishable not only for the nature of its intrusion,
but because the Court relied in making its decision on two elements absent from Bill
No. 6747-B: (1) the disclosures were not "significantly different" from those already
required by law, and (2) it could not be said that "any individual has been deprived of
the right to decide independently." Id. at 602.
102. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (rejecting former President Nixon's privacy challenge to a
federal law that authorized the seizure and screening of his documents and tape
recordings).
103. Id. at 458.
104. United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
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from the Circuit Courts to guide its implementation. l05 The
Whalen-Nixon balancing test has been interpreted by the Third
Circuit as sanctioning disclosures regarding "past medical history,
present illness, or the fact of treatment" in those circumstances
where "the government has advanced a need to acquire the infor-
mation to develop treatment programs or control threats to public
health."'0 6 However, although the individual's right to control ac-
cess to personal matters is not absolute, the State must still demon-
strate that "the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy
interest on the specific facts of the case. ' 10 7 The D.C. Circuit has
held that the standard by which the right to nondisclosure is to be
protected requires examining "the need for intrusion against its se-
verity.' 0 8 The Fifth Circuit has held that the standard for judging
the lawfulness of intrusive legislation requires comparing "the in-
terest it serves against those it hinders."'0 9 The D.C. Circuit has
also determined that Supreme Court precedent mandates that "all
lawful privacy intrusions must be narrowly drawn" and "reasonably
related in scope to the justification for their initiation."' 10 Finally,
the 9th Circuit has held that the burden on the State to justify an
infringement of informational privacy increases with the sensitivity
of the information disclosed and the severity of the intrusion.'
In United States v. Westinghouse, 1 2 in which the State sought ac-
cess to certain employee medical records, the Third Circuit sug-
gested that the following factors should be considered "in deciding
whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified:""13 (1)
the type of record requested, (2) the information that is contained
or may be contained in the record, (3) the potential for harm in any
subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (4) the injury from disclo-
105. But see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding no constitutional
right of nondisclosure in juvenile social histories prepared by State).
106. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
107. Id.
108. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussing the evolution of the right to confidentiality in Supreme Court and Circuit
Court jurisprudence).
109. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979).
110. Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1023 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).
111. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 979 (1983).
112. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying an employer the right to refuse the Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health access to its employees health
records, but requiring prior notice from the Institute to permit employees to raise
personal privacy claims).
113. Id. at 578.
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sure to the relationship in which the record was generated, (5) the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (6) the
degree of need for access, and (7) whether there is an express stat-
utory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access. Under these standards,
Bill No. 6747-B does not pass constitutional scrutiny.
2. Bill No. 6747-B's Infringement of Individual Privacy is not
Outweighed by the Public Interest it Serves
It cannot be reasonably argued that the state lacks an interest in
protecting the public against the spread of HIV infection. 114 Even
an important interest, however, is not by itself dispositive in a bal-
ancing test, which is contingent on the means chosen to reach this
end and the burden those means place on the individual. This im-
plicitly requires assessing how well the governmental purpose is
served by the means selected. Were it otherwise, the overwhelm-
ing weight of the AIDS crisis would smother whatever right to pri-
vacy was offered against it, regardless of the substantive merits of
the state proposal. 115
114. Before even proceeding to a balancing test, it must be shown that the informa-
tion at issue constitutes a "personal matter" as required by Whalen. It is generally
agreed, particularly in more recent case law, that one's medical condition, including
one's HIV status, qualifies as a "personal matter." See, e.g., United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (medical information is part of
that "private enclave where [the individual] may lead a private life" and "there can be
no question that an employee's medical record, which may contain intimate facts of a
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection)
(citation omitted); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), affd, 899
F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[lIt is difficult to argue that information about [AIDS or
HIV status] is not information of the most personal kind, or that an individual would
not have an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such information.").
New York courts have also held that medical and HIV status constitutes confidential
information. See Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (ac-
knowledging a right to privacy in preventing the non-consensual disclosure of one's
medical condition or diagnosis); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 724 (Sup. Ct. 1988)
("Existing regulations and laws, as well as the stated policy of responsible Health
Department and health officials demonstrate a public policy militating strongly
against court interference in the confidentiality of existing records, and unalterably
opposed to judicially coerced non-voluntary testing.").
115. One New York court has shown model sensitivity to the context in which
mandatory testing is put:
The question is, therefore, what standard must be met, or what showing
made before an involuntary AIDS test can be compelled. Before this ques-
tion can be addressed, the present level of knowledge concerning AIDS and
AIDS testing, as well as special problems such testing raises, relevant case
law and clearly expressed public policy must all be reviewed and considered.
Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
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Although the courts review public health statutes under a pre-
sumption of validity,' 16 an unjustified statutory intrusion will be
struck down, particularly when it impairs privacy and when a less
restrictive method can achieve the same objective." 7 This principle
is well stated in Wong Wai v. Williamson, 8 in which a city ordi-
nance aimed at stopping the bubonic plague required that all Chi-
nese residents be innoculated:
If the legislature, in the interests of the public health, enacts a
law, and thereby interferes with the personal rights of an indi-
vidual, destroys or impairs his liberty or property-it then,
under such circumstances, becomes the duty of the courts to re-
view such legislation, and determine whether it in reality relates
to, and is appropriate to secure, the object in view; and in such
an examination the court will look to the substance of the thing
involved, and will not be controlled by mere forms." 9
The "object in view" of Bill No. 6747-B is not simply HIV testing
and disclosure. These are a means to an end and not an end them-
selves. The purpose of the proposal is to bring immediate, im-
proved medical care to more AIDS-threatened babies than
currently receive it. But this purpose is fatally undermined by the
means chosen to achieve it. A mandatory testing and disclosure
scheme will not provide for enough immediate, improved care of
infants to justify its substantial invasion of their mothers' privacy.
Several pragmatic factors combine to undermine the likelihood of
Bill No. 6747-B's success and contribute to its failure of a constitu-
tional balancing test: (1) fear of discrimination and care avoidance;
(2) the absence of direct linkage to follow-up care; (3) alienation of
the mother; (4) the uncertain relationship between early identifica-
tion and improved care; (5) the misapplication of a traditional pub-
116. See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952) (tuberculosis statute);
Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (leprosy regulations).
117. See, e.g., Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (plague regu-
lations); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.
1979) (hepatitis B school plan); Hershberg v. City of Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky.
1911) (smoking ordinance). See generally, Comment, The Constitutional Rights of
Aids Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986); Closen, supra note 94, at 465 ("[A]
court will invalidate a health and welfare statute in which the substance of the law is
not genuinely related to, or is not really appropriate to, the accomplishment of its
health or welfare goal (i.e., other, less objectionable methods are just as likely to
achieve the desired purpose).").
118. 103 F. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
119. Wong Wai, 103 F. at 7 (emphasis added)(citation omitted); see also Jew Ho v.
Williamson, 103 F. 10, 22 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (invalidating quarantining of San Francisco
Asians because, inter alia, it would not prevent the spread of the bubonic plague).
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lic health care solution to a non-traditional public health problem;
and (6) the viability of a superior alternative.
a. Discrimination and Care Avoidance
The absence of a provision in Bill No. 6747-B for a general dis-
closure or public dissemination of the mother's status does not
mean that the discrimination which accompanies AIDS is irrele-
vant to these mothers or to the purpose of the bill. On the con-
trary, there is a likely, significant social fallout from mandatory
screening that seriously reduces the bill's effectiveness. Although
Bill No. 6747-B does not create the physical suffering or the social
discrimination that attend AIDS, its effectiveness will be under-
mined by the fact that mothers unwilling to be forced into con-
fronting either reality will avoid mandatory testing or resist
cooperating with positive results.
Two lines of argument suggest that societal factors are irrelevant
when balancing the bill's intrusiveness against its benefits. The first
posits that there is no privacy invasion at all because the only per-
son to whom the testing results are disclosed is the same person to
whom they are confidential. The second posits that even though
there is a privacy invasion, it is not terribly intrusive, and not pub-
lic, because results are disclosed confidentially and kept between
the State and the mother.
The first argument is easily refuted. Although it represents a
common paradigm,'120 direct disclosure by the State to a third party
is not a necessary predicate to an invasion of privacy. Simply the
taking and recording by state agencies of personal matters is suffi-
cient to infringe individual privacy. Such was the case, for exam-
ple, in Whalen and Westinghouse, where the State sought access to
already existing personal records for governmental purposes which
did not entail sharing the information with other parties. Addition-
ally, the circumstances of Bill No. 6747-B are more intrusive that in
either Whalen or Westinghouse in that mandatory screening of
newborns (1) creates a State program which not only collects per-
sonal information, but discloses this newly collected information
through health care providers who are necessarily made aware of
120. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (disclo-
sure of individual's HIV status by police to neighbors); Carter v. Broadlawns Med.
Cen., 667 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (S.D. Iowa 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989)
(disclosure of individual's HIV status by hospital to chaplain); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F.
Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (disclosure of individual's HIV status by prison to
prisoners).
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the mother's status,'121 and (2) provides not simply for accessing
already recorded personal information, but for obtaining previ-
ously unrecorded personal information from nonconsenting per-
sons. A third way to refute this argument is to conceive of the
mother as both the testee from whom personal information is
taken, and the third party to whom that information is revealed.
This conception is supported by the state's own approach to the
issue. In Bill No. 6747-B, the mother is treated as a carrier whose
rights are subordinate to the newborn's for purposes of testing, but
as a caregiver whose decision-making is crucial to improved care
for purposes of treatment. The ends and means of the bill itself
treat the mother as separable individuals, the one from whom con-
fidential information is taken and the one to whom it is given.
As to the second argument, no one seriously suggests that there
is any real guarantee of confidentiality in such a statewide, institu-
tionalized testing scheme as is proposed. It is widely acknowledged
by care providers and hospital administrators, 22 legal commenta-
tors,'1 23 and advocacy groups124 that problems with leakage and dis-
semination of confidential medical information are endemic. 125
Furthermore, even if disclosure through intentional or careless
leakage were not inevitable, societal disclosure would still be
121. It is also likely that within the close environment of a health care center or
hospital HIV ward more than a single caregiver will be made aware of the mother's
status. This group could include administrators, clerks, secretaries, nurses, doctors,
midwives, and other patients. Alternatively, the common, third party privacy para-
digm may be satisfied by viewing the hospital as taking confidential information from
the mother and disclosing it to the State and her caregiver.
122. Hearing of the Newborn Screening Subcommittee, New York State AIDS Advi-
sory Council (Nov. 9, 1993) (Comments by Dr. Allan Rosenfeld, Dean of Columbia
University School of Public Health, calling the supposed confidentiality of hospital
records a "farce").
123. See Michael Closen et al., AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational Responses to
the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 835, 888 ("[Tlhere are no effective guarantees as to the confidentiality of test
results or the purposes to which results may be put."); Field, supra note 32, at 409-10
(citing not only inherent systemic leaks and an absence of safeguards, but external
pressures to release data from courts, employers, insurers, family, etc.: "the reality
may be that it is difficult to maintain total confidentiality once a person is found to be
HIV positive").
124. Hearing of the Newborn Screening Subcommittee, New York State AIDS Advi-
sory Council (Nov. 8, 1993) (testimony of Terry Maroney, New York City Gay and
Lesbian Anti-Violence Project).
125. See AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 3.2. ("[C]onfidential HIV test-
ing may not be all that the term suggests."); see also Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718,
723 (Sup. Ct. 1988) ("The State and City have demonstrated a similar concern for the
confidentiality of records of persons already tested and found to be infected with
AIDS.").
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forced upon any mother who actively seeks improved care for her
child. It would be exceedingly difficult to respond appropriately to
a positive test result and still maintain confidentiality. Here are
just some of the ways in which a mother who conscientiously re-
sponds to a positive result would publicly betray her HIV-positive
status:
(1) By modifying and monitoring her behavior and her child's,
by adjusting dietary and sleeping habits and by administering a reg-
ular course of medication, and by maintaining a healthy household,
a mother is unlikely to be able to hide her condition from her fam-
ily or (potentially abusive) spouse.
(2) By pursuing treatment for herself and her child through rou-
tine visits several days a week to a community hospital or health
care center would presumably also betray her circumstance to
neighbors and friends, or to anyone interested enough to scrutinize
the clinic's clients.
(3) Even if the mother could conceal from her immediate com-
munity both her and her child's status and still provide for im-
proved care, she would not be able to conceal it from insurance
companies, employers, health maintenance organizations, and
other institutions which now routinely inquire of applicants what
their status is or if they have been AIDS tested. 126 These mothers
would then be put in a situation where they would have to lie to
maintain their privacy or risk losing their insurance coverage, job,
or home. 27
(4) Even for the mother who does not pursue a course of treat-
ment, there is a substantial risk of exposure to third parties, namely
to the fathers. Not only does Bill No. 6747-B provide for disclo-
sure to the father if the mother "cannot be located,"'128 but under
Article 27-F of the New York Public Health Law, a physician may
notify a partner of an HIV-positive person if the physician "reason-
ably believes that: disclosure is medically appropriate; the partner
is at significant risk; and the HIV-positive patient will not inform
the partner.' 29
126. See Field, supra note 32, at 409-10.
127. See id. at 410. Field notes a Fifth Circuit case in which the court held that
ERISA does not prohibit an employer from reducing an existing insurance policy
from a $1,000,000 lifetime medical benefit to a $5,000 benefit after an employee with
AIDS filed for reimbursement. Id. at 410 n.29 (citing McGann v. H & H Music Co.,
946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992)).
128. See supra note 75.
129. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE
NEW YORK STATE CONFIDENTIALITY LAW (1989).
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In both Whalen and Nixon, the Supreme Court has noted the
difference in intrusiveness between those disclosures made only to
the State and those made to the public. The latter type of disclo-
sure increases the burden on the State to justify its infringing legis-
lation.130 'A public as opposed to governmental dissemination of
confidential information has been considered by at least one Cir-
cuit Court to be a "severe" intrusion that can only be justified by a
"compelling interest.' 131 This analysis, although instructive, is at-
tenuated when the public disclosure is only indirectly forced by the
State.
Because the burden on the state to justify an infringement of
informational privacy increases with the sensitivity of the informa-
tion disclosed and the severity of the intrusion,132 it is critical to
consider the unique medical and social significance of AIDS when
attempting to justify mandatory HIV screening. Diagnosis with
HIV is a matter of great privacy. It is hard to imagine a medical
disclosure more serious or sensitive than infection with the AIDS
virus, the precursor to an incurable and invariably fatal disease.
The trauma of that disclosure is only partially accounted for by its
severe physical implications.133 Perhaps the more brutal aspect of
an HIV/AIDS diagnosis is the inevitable stigma and discrimination
that accompany it.
Even if the positively diagnosed mother is able herself to accept
and respond positively to her diagnosis, greater society has proven
far less willing to do so. AIDS victims and persons known to be
HIV-positive are routinely subject to direct and indirect discrimi-
nation in many forms.3 Major areas of discrimination are hous-
130. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
131. Id. at 1023 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Broad
dissemination by state officials of [personal] information . . .would presumably be
justified only by compelling state interests.")).
132. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
133. For example, two of the primary opportunistic diseases which afflict AIDS
victims are Kaposi's sarcoma and pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. The former is a
rare form of severely disfiguring cancer, producing blue-black skin blotches and le-
sions and accompanied by severe weight loss. People with HIV/AIDS may also suffer
from profound fatigue, profuse night sweating, oral thrush, persistent fevers, swollen
lymph nodes, digestive tract infections, loss of appetite, tuberculosis, shingles, head-
aches, emotional upset, dementia and other health disorders. Science, unable to cure
HIV/AIDS, has only been able to treat its symptoms, thus prolonging life and indi-
rectly exposing patients to a growing list of opportunistic infections. JARVIS ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 6-7, 14-17, 19, 22-23.
134. See generally Eisenstadt, supra note 94, at 364-69. An extensive survey pub-
lished in 1990, typical of the national mood, revealed that whereas over four-fifths of
those surveyed believed that those who contracted AIDS through blood transfusions
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ing, insurance, employment, education (particularly against
children), and health care.13 Compounding the fear of losing one's
job, apartment, or insurance is the daily humiliation and isolation
caused by general fear, ignorance, misperception and prejudice.136
Like the physical toll, the social costs of AIDS are opportunistic
and persistent; and the stress to one's psyche and spirit is
profound. 37 The impact on poor, minority, childbearing women
should be treated with compassion, less than one-half of those polled believed that
persons infected through homosexual activity, intravenous drug use, or sexual rela-
tions with an intravenous drug user should be treated with compassion. Renee Gra-
ham, Most Favor Bigger US. Role in AIDS Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 1990, at 1.
135. See Closen et al., supra note 123, at 927-28. Discrimination is also manifest in
the various legislative and private efforts proposed to combat the epidemic, such as
mandatory tattooing, exclusionary zoning, identification cards, and quarantining. Id.
at 838-39. Many of the more extreme suggestions are motivated by homophobia. Id.
Sterilization has also been offered as an alternative means of containment. Field,
supra note 32, at 417. Criminalizing the transfer of HIV has recently become a popu-
lar response. See Richard T. Andrias, Urban Criminal Justice: Has the Response to
the HIV Epidemic Been "Fair?", 20 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 497 (1993); Scott H. Isaac-
man, Are We Outlawing Motherhood for HIV-Infected Women?, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
479 (1991); Deborah Wieczorkowski Wanamaker, From Mother to Child... A Crimi-
nal Pregnancy: Should Criminalization of the Prenatal Transfer of AIDS/HIV be the
Next Step in the Battle Against this Deadly Epidemic?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 383 (1993);
Louise M. Chan, Note, S.O.S. From the Womb: A Call for New York Legislation
Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 199 (1994). But
see Jennifer Mone, Has Connecticut Thrown Out the Baby with the Bath Water? Ter-
mination of Parental Rights and In re Valerie D., 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535 (1992)
(arguing that State protection of the best interests of the child neither necessitates
pitting the welfare of the child against the rights of the mother nor justifies termina-
tion of parental rights).
136. The discriminatory effects of AIDS have not been lost on the courts. "A per-
son who has been involuntarily tested for AIDS and receives a positive result may
suffer a number of possible injuries. Perhaps first and foremost among these is the
danger of stigmatization and ostracism which may result." Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 721
(citing American Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees, Prevention and Control of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim Report, 258 JAMA 2097, 2098 (1987)).
137. See Closen, supra note 123, at 875 n.172 ("[Tjhe trauma of learning about a
positive antibody result can be psychologically devastating."); see also Marshall For-
stein, Understanding the Psychological Impact of AIDS: The Other Epidemic, 4 NEW
ENG. J. PUB. POL'Y 159 (1988); Hearings before the Newborn Screening Committee
(Nov. 8, 1993) (testimonies of Eleanor Mitchell and Phyllis Sharpe, HIV-infected
mothers of newborns). See generally AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, § 1.2 (Psychological
and Social Concerns of People with HIV).
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may be particularly harsh,138 as pregnancy becomes a particularly
vulnerable occasion for unwanted intrusion. 39
Not only would parturient women be forced to confront the
medical and social realities of AIDS, which is a substantial burden
in itself, but experts fear that these realities will cause some preg-
nant women to shun prenatal care and hospital births rather than
risk being exposed. 40 "Care avoidance" is the term used to de-
scribe this unfortunate cycle, which exists predominantly among
disadvantaged women who may already have reasons to distrust
institutional authority. 4' These are the same populations among
which seroprevalence rates are highest. 42 Mandatory testing and
the consequent fear of exposure will increase care avoidance
among those women who do not wish to be tested for AIDS. Thus,
not only does care avoidance lead to increased infant mortality
rates (because women who do not want to be tested give birth
under less safe conditions), but it will undermine the goal of Bill
No. 6747-B by preventing the children most at-risk from being
tested.
Although the risk of care avoidance is not as significant a factor
here as it is in the context of drug-addicted parturient women who
138. "[Elvidence suggests that poor, minority women risk the devastation of their
personal and family relationships, the loss of social and medical services, the loss of
control of their own medical decisions, and even the loss of their children." Working
Group on HIV Testing of Women and Newborns: A Policy Proposal for Information
and Testing, 264 JAMA 2416, 2418 (1990).
139. "The stigma of a positive HIV antibody test-loss of employment, insurance,
housing, and other economic or social harm-provides another reason for women
who suspect they are infected with HIV to avoid routine prenatal screening." Taunya
Lovell Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 351, 370 (1990).
140. See Kathleen Nolan, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, Women, and
Pregnancy, 17 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINICS OF N. AMER. 651, 658 (1990);
Field, supra note 32, at 422; Isaacman, supra note 135, at 482. See generally Hearings
before the Newborn Screening Subcommittee (Nov. 8-9, 1993).
141. See Isaacman, supra note 135, at 481-82. These women fear accusations that
they are unfit for motherhood, that they have abused the child, and that they are
drug-abusers. Id. Some also fear, therefore, that their child will be taken from them
and put in foster care; others may be living in this country illegally or are otherwise
deterred by language, cultural, educational barriers. See Hearing before the Newborn
Screening Subcommittee (Nov. 8, 1993) (Testimonies of Dr. Carola Marte of Beth
Israel Medical Center-"stigmatization in the health care system is given as the pri-
mary reason for not seeking or for refusing HIV care"; David M. Abramson, MPH, of
Columbia School of Public Health-relating to barriers to HIV care, "[tlhe overriding
concern expressed by these women was fear"; and Shannon Cain, Executive Director,
Women's Health Education Project-mandatory HIV screening "could drive preg-
nant women further away from getting crucial prenatal care, not to mention make
them hesitant to go to the hospital when it comes time to give birth").
142. See supra part II.A. (discussing the demographics of HIV-infection in women).
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fear criminal or civil penalties for the intra-uterine transfer of illicit
substances, 43 it is nevertheless a factor to weigh in the balance.'"
The absence from Bill No. 6747-B of a provision for pre-test
or post-disclosure counseling highlights its slight regard for the
mother's privacy. Counseling could at least in part prepare at-risk
mothers for the immediate and longterm difficulties that disclosure
will entail. Instead, there is no preparation, education, or instruc-
tion, only the grim news of infection for both mother and, perhaps,
child. This slight regard for the impact of disclosure on the mother
runs counter to the doctrine of informed consent, 45 the protective
laws in place in New York and many other states, 46 and the widely
143. See, e.g., Isaacman, supra note 135.
144. A lesson can be learned from Illinois' experiment with a mandatory AIDS test
as a prerequisite to attaining a marriage license. Proposed in January of 1988, the bill
was repealed in September of 1989. Rather than submit to forced testing, hundreds of
couples traveled to neighboring states to get their licenses. See George Papajohn &
Charles Mount, Illinois Licenses Soar After repeal of AIDS Test Law, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
11, 1989, at 2.
145. For a general discussion of the doctrine, see FAY A. RozoKovsKY, CONSENT
TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, §§ 11.0-11.11 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1992).
Informed consent, which derives from principals of tort rather than constitutional law,
is central to issues of medical privacy. Broadly recognized by the states and the medi-
cal community, it has been embraced by the Supreme Court as well. See Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) ("The logical corollary of
the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not
to consent, that is, to refuse treatment."). Some states, however, have selectively re-
jected the doctrine in certain circumstances, including pregnancy, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 384.23(3), 384.31 (West Supp. 1992), and parental consent, see R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-6-14(a) (1989 & Supp. 1993) (testing without consent at discretion of
health care provider on any patient less than one year old); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-
148(h) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (testing without consent when there is a reasonable suspi-
cion that a minor has AIDS or is HIV-infected). Confidentiality laws and informed
consent are meant to encourage persons to seek care and reveal to caregivers the full
circumstance of their illness without fear of betrayal to third persons or fear of receiv-
ing unwanted treatment. See RozovsKY, supra, at 740; Candace C. Gauthier, H/V
Testing and Confidentiality, 2 BIOLAw 349, 351 (Mar.-Apr. 1990) (special section); see
also Troyen A. Brennan, AIDS and the Limits of Confidentiality, 4 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 242 (1988). Exceptions to informed consent undermine the trust between at-
risk women and caregivers that is crucial to improving access to care.
146. See Albert et al., supra note 6, at § 3.4(2). "Many states have now enacted
legislation that specifically protects the confidentiality of HIV-related information.
The adoption of these statutes reflects the widespread acceptance of a public health
strategy that encourages voluntary HIV antibody testing, and hence requires protection
from harm for those who choose to be tested." Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis
added). In addition to Art. 27-F of the Public Health Law, New York has in place
other confidentiality-protective laws. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780(9) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1990) (requiring fully-informed written consent and specification of the
time, purpose, and recipient(s) of disclosure); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1991), 1988 N.Y. Laws 9265-A § 2781(3), and N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
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accepted public health policy which informs those laws. 147 This
head-in-the-sand pursuit of its goal handicaps the bill's effective-
ness by increasing the likelihood of care avoidance by those most
in need of care.
b. No Linkage to Care
Bill No. 6747-B offers no provision and no legislative strategy for
providing the kind of follow-up care which disclosure is intended to
facilitate. The bill thus raises, without answering, the question of
how care will occur for the hundreds of new babies identified as
antibody positive.
Identification merely begins the process of providing improved
care. To surprise unprepared mothers with the doubly traumatic
news that they are HIV-positive and their baby may also be will
not necessarily lead to better treatment for their children. Particu-
larly in an inner city environment, many obstacles stand in the way
of that outcome. Linkage to care is hardly automatic.
First, there is already a scarcity of adequate counseling and serv-
ices for those inflicted with HIV/AIDS, especially women.148 Fear
and discrimination are not stilled by the Hippocratic Oath, and
§ 2781(6), 2783 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (civil penalties plus misdemeanor for willful
violations of confidentiality).
147. Not only does Bill No. 6747-B undermine the medical purpose behind in-
formed consent, it also defies a trend in New York to shore this doctrine against fur-
ther erosion. Since the late 1980's, "[tlhe clear position of state and city health
officials has been a virtually complete ban on involuntary testing for the HIV virus."
Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723. The legislature intended Article 27-F of the Pub-
lic Health Law to "provid[e] additional protection of the confidentiality of HIV re-
lated information . . . [and] to encourage the expansion of voluntary confidential
testing for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) so that the individuals may come
forward, learn their health status, make decisions regarding the appropriate treat-
ment, and change the behavior that puts them and others at risk of infection. The
legislature also recognizes that strong confidentiality protections can limit the risk of
discrimination and the harm to an individual's interest in privacy that unauthorized
disclosure of HIV related information can cause. It is the intent of the legislature that
exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality of HIV related information be strictly
construed." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 (McKinney 1993) (quoting § 1, L. 1988, c.
584, eff. Feb. 1, 1989) (emphasis added). This legislative rationale-stressing volun-
tary cooperation and behavioral change over the discriminatory risks of forced testing
and disclosure-mirrors the argument against mandatory newborn screening.
148. Hearing before the Newborn Screening Subcommittee, New York State AIDS
Advisory Council (Nov. 8-9, 1993); see also Arlene M. Butz et al., HIV.Infected Wo-
men and Infants: Social and Health Factors Impeding Utilization of Health Care, 38 J.
NURSE-MIDWIFERY. 103 (1993); Carol Levine & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, HIV and
Childbearing: Uncertain Risks and Bitter Realities: The Reproductive Choices of HIV-
infected Women, 68 MILBANK Q. 321, 339 (1990) ("Access to health care in the inner
cities varies from limited to nonexistent.").
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there is rather an unfortunate withdrawal even within the medical
community from the HIV/AIDS population. 49 In addition, there
is a lack of funding for and organization of AIDS-related serv-
ices.' 50 As a result, the medical community dedicated on a daily
basis to providing acute care is overwhelmed by the number of
cases requiring acute care. 5' Without direct linkage to care, which
requires an expansion of available services, those infants who are
identified as at risk may find improved care unavailable.
Second, the proper response to a positive diagnosis is by no
means obvious or simple. Without close supervision, improved
care becomes a matter of guesswork. Treatment of newborn HIV-
infection requires of the mother long-term, consistent, informed,
behavioral change. In addition to looking after her own health and
household, the infected mother may have to administer a regular,
intense course of medication to the child, arrange for regular visits
to a health care provider and follow the prescribed daily regimen,
maintain a strict vigil over the infant's diet, general symptoms and
behavior, and, in short, successfully modify her own behavior and
149. The stories of doctors and institutions turning their back on AIDS/HIV-in-
flicted patients are many. A typical story was related by Jeffrey Reynolds, represent-
ing the Long Island Association for AIDS Care, Inc., in his testimony before the
Newborn Screening Committee, on Nov. 8, 1993. Mr. Reynolds told of recent efforts
by the Association to contact doctors who would be willing to take AIDS/HIV refer-
rals. Of the 13 contacted, 12 doctors said they would not take referrals, and one said
to call "if things got bad." This phenomenon was confirmed recently by New York
City Councilman, Thomas Duane, in an address at Fordham Law School on Nov. 10,
1993, entitled Recent AIDS Legislation. Mr. Duane, who represents a district that
includes much of liberal Greenwich Village, noted that "even there" professional in-
tolerance was unavoidable. For example, of 5,800 dentists surveyed nationwide, less
than a third expressed a willingness to treat AIDS patients. Bruce Lambert, Experts
Fault Doctors on AIDS Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1990, at D3 ("Nine years into
the AIDS epidemic, most of the nation's physicians still are failing to take part in the
fight to treat and control the deadly disease, many health expert say"). This discrimi-
nation has persisted despite the state and federal anti-discrimination legislation it has
necessitated, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12189 (1990). The ADA prohibits discrimination against persons
with disabilities, including AIDS or HIV infection (and, in some jurisdictions, those
perceived to be HIV-infected). 104 Stat. 267, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(1990).
150. The Newborn Screening Subcommittee, citing "severe obstacles to the provi-
sion of timely medical, mental health, and supportive social services," Newborn
Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 21-22, called the existing network of
programs "inaccessible, fragmented, or overburdened." Id. at 33.
151. The consensus among the Newborn Screening Committee was that current ur-
ban services were understaffed and overburdened. In the words of Co-Chair Dr.
Carolyn Britton, addressing the 16-member committee on the availability of acute
HIV/AIDS care in the New York City: "This is it. We are it." Hearing of the New-
born Screening Subcommittee, New York State AIDS Advisory Council (Nov. 9, 1993).
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regulate her household so as to reduce or eliminate any extraneous
risks to her child's (or her children's'52 ) health. Frequently, she
must accomplish this under disadvantaged circumstances, and in
the shadow of normally discriminatory attitudes towards her social
and physical circumstance.
Third, current testing procedures raise unanswered questions
about the nature and timing of disclosure itself, which is the crucial
link between testing and care. Under the most commonly used
form of newborn testing, 53 results are usually not returned to the
hospital for several weeks. 54 Under new testing procedures that
are gaining favor for their ability to more accurately identify the
infant's actual status,'155 results still take from several days to sev-
eral weeks to return, and some of these tests are not even useful
until the newborn is several months old.15 6 The net result is that
the mother and child will already have been discharged from the
hospital by the time results are available. This time lapse raises its
own set of unanswered questions. How will a mother be notified of
her results and will that means be compassionate and practical?
Will all mothers even be reachable at their given addresses? If a
mother does not respond to a mailed notice, what other measures
will be taken? If a mother does not seek pediatric care at the same
hospital at which she gave birth, will her treating physician know of
her status or the infant's? If the mother does not respond at all,
will she be subject to further State action? If inadequately an-
swered, these details about notice could seriously impair the goal
of improved care for HIV-positive infants.
Finally, without explicit linkage to care the mother may not over-
come her own unwillingness to face her condition and the stigma it
carries. Even her willingness to seek care for her child may be
compromised by distrust of a test for which she was unprepared, or
152. Depending on when she contracted the virus, the HIV-positive parturient wo-
man may have vertically passed it to previous children who may also be infected.
153. The routine infant HIV antibody test is the enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay ("ELISA") test. Tinkle et al., supra note 28, at 88. The ELISA test is often
confirmed by a Western Blot test. Id. at 88-89.
154. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 4 (HIV test
results take about one month).
155. See Field, supra note 32, at 424-25 n.82. These tests are the HIV Culture test,
the Polymerase Chain Reaction, the P-24 Antigen test, and the IGA Antibody test.
Id.; see also Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, Appendix F
(Current Procedures for Newborn Congenital Disease Screening).
156. See Field, supra note 32, at 424-25 n.82. These tests are the HIV Culture test,
the Polymerase Chain Reaction, the P-24 Antigen test, and the IGA Antibody test.
Id.; see also Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, App. F (Current
Procedures for Newborn Congenital Disease Screening).
1994]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
by the 75% chance that her child is not in fact infected. Bill No.
6747-B's means do not realistically provide for its goal. The bill
assumes that the common response to mandatory testing and dis-
closure will be the one that it implicitly demands-willing coopera-
tion and fully informed behavioral change. In the real world, this
assumption carries little weight. 157 Given the history of discrimina-
tion against persons with HIV/AIDS, its imperviousness to a cure,
and the slim chance that the newborn will test positive-and even
if it does, the 75% chance that it will seroconvert- it is clear that
the ineffectiveness of the bill in remedying the problem it ad-
dresses renders it unreasonable in light of the privacy intrusion im-
posed by it. Without encouragement and information, and without
the support to overcome the social stigma and physical debilitation
of HIV-infection, behavioral change should not be assumed; and
without care, forced disclosure is a profound burden without the
promise of any benefit.
c. Bill No. 6747-B Unneccesarily Alienates the Mother
Mandatory testing reflects a policy that ignores the needs and
views of the mother. In rushing to the cause of the newborn, the
bill characterizes the mother in one harsh light: as a carrier in a
chain of infection.'58 This narrow legislative conceptualization is
unnecessary, unfair, and ultimately counter productive, because
the success of the bill is contingent upon fully recognizing and em-
powering the mother as a care provider. 159
157. See Field, supra note 32, at 413. Contrary to the presumption of increased
precaution, persons mentally unprepared for disclosure of their status often engage in
erratic, violent, self-destructive behavior. Id. Closen argues that even voluntary test-
ing labors under"[t]he unspoken but fallacious rationale behind voluntary testing for
[HIV] antibodies is that the person, once he or she learns that test result, will engage
in some type of behavior modification." Closen, supra note 123, at 876. In the case of
HIV-positive mothers of the positive newborn, however, the real fear is not self-de-
structive behavior but a lack of voluntary cooperation. It is hoped that voluntary
testing and peer counseling linked to services will prepare the mother to place the
needs of the child first. See infra part IV.A.2.f. (discussing the willingness of peer-
counseled mothers to cooperate).
158. See, e.g., Kurth & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 121.
159. Simply conceptualizing the mother as a carrier-as a source or vector of infec-
tion-has the further unfortunate result of putting the rights of the mother and the
rights of the baby in conflict. The issue here, in terms of the law and ethics, should
not be whose rights come first or whose rights are more important. In treatment as in
birth, the mother and child should be treated as a unit. Improvements in family
health care are made not by dividing the family unit, but by strengthening the internal
and external apparatus which support it. But see Mayersohn, supra note 76, at 2 ("In
any event, any reasonable person would argue that the baby's right to survive must be
our first concern.").
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Ironically, the mother's confidentiality and autonomy, 60 ignored
by the state for purposes of testing and disclosure, become indis-
pensable for purposes of improved treatment. At testing, the
mother's interest in confidentiality is secondary; at disclosure, her
privacy and the discrimination to which she will likely be subjected
is also disregarded; but when it comes time to act on the results, the
once transparent mother is again recognized and called upon to
cooperate with the State by providing the care and supervision that
it cannot. Although willing to step over the mother at the moment
of birth for the sake of the child, the State must thereafter, for the
sake of the child, step back and invite the mother to reassume the
role it had usurped.'
.A mother's voluntary decision-making and her privacy in so de-
ciding provide the child's best hope for improved care. The real
work of Bill No. 6747-B can only be achieved by a mother who is
much more than a carrier. It is the mother who must bring the
child for follow-up care, who must follow the caregiver's regimen,
who must keep a healthy and loving home and respond to her
child's changing condition. For the state to conceptualize and treat
the mother one way when exercising its power, but rely on her in a
completely different way when setting its goals, is political expedi-
ency. When the decision-making of the mother after disclosure is
the key to the success of the state's intervention, her decision-mak-
ing before testing should not be ignored. 62
d. Questionable Benefits of Early Detection and Treatment
Questions concerning the benefits of early detection of HIV-in-
fection in newborns further compromise the interests served by Bill
No. 6747-B. While there is a clear consensus that early identifica-
160. See infra part III.B. (discussing autonomy).
161. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 20 ("[Tlhe in-
fected child's health and well being are usually directly dependent on his or her
mother's health and well being.").
162. Whatever means are used to combat pediatric AIDS, it should not degrade,
alienate, or isolate the mother. Voluntary testing is promising because it treats the
mother as an ally rather than an adversary in the crusade for improved newborn care.
As Dr. Britton noted at the Nov. 9 public hearing of the Newborn Screening Commit-
tee, the most effective care of the newborn and the family exposed to HIV/AIDS will
occur in a supportive, loving environment. Her comments echo those of a legal
scholar describing the essence of privacy. "To respect, love, trust, feel affection for
others and to regard ourselves as the objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart
of our notion of ourselves as persons among persons, and privacy is the necessary
atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for combustion." Charles
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968).
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tion of possibly infected newborns is itself desirable, 63 there is no
consensus as to how to use early test results. There are two prelim-
inary constraints on the utility of follow-up care: (1) there is no
cure for HIV infection or pediatric AIDS, and (2) three-fourths of
antibody-positive newborns are not infected and have nothing to
gain from medical treatment. In addition, there are too many med-
ical uncertainties to assume that an early identification of an an-
tibody-positive newborn will of itself trigger improved care,
especially the kind of immediate, acute care that proponents of the
bill stress.
Because of the turnaround time required in current testing pro-
cedures no treatment is truly immediate. The normal lapse, simply
for returning test results and not for actually notifying the mother
or getting the newborn to a care facility, is several weeks; and stud-
ies show that it can take another several months before the parent
of a positively tested child can be reached.' 64 Therefore, although
immediate care is stressed by proponents of the bill, delay in dis-
closure may neutralize the usefulness of "early" detection. Early
treatment is crucial because HIV infection generally progresses
faster in infants than in adults, 65 manifesting itself in opportunistic
diseases as early as one week after birth. 66 Because of the short-
ened incubation period, prophylactic or antiretroviral treatment to
prevent the onset of opportunistic diseases must occur as soon as
possible. 167 This is especially true for the most deadly of the pedi-
atric AIDS killers, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia ("PCP"). 168 In
one study, PCP presented itself at a median age of five months,
with a median survival time thereafter of only one month. 69
A second variable to be weighed when balancing the benefits of
early medical treatment against the invasiveness of forced disclo-
163. See, e.g., Mendez & Jule, supra note 12, at 637.
164. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 31 ("It often
takes longer than a 13-week tracing period to reach a parent and requires a variety of
strategies.").
165. See generally Scott et al., supra note 7.
166. Id. at 1792.
167. "In particular, there is only a short period during which antiviral treatment or
other effective prophylactic measures can be initiated before the onset of clinical dis-
ease. This emphasizes the importance of early recognition of HIV-1 infection in chil-
dren to permit early and effective treatment." Id. at 1795. In Scott's study, the
majority of children diagnosed with HIV-associated diseases were under one year of
age. Id. at 1792. The younger the child at diagnosis, the shorter the survival time. Id.
at 1794.
168. See Field, supra note 32, at 430 (PCP is "the major lethal complication of pedi-
atric HIV infection.").
169. See Scott, supra note 7, at 1791.
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sure is the eventual seroconversion of three-fourths of those
newborns who test positive. These children are not in fact infected,
and just as healthy as any child born to a non-HIV-positive mother.
There is therefore no benefit to these children from immediate,
acute care. In fact there is a risk that highly toxic treatments can
harm uninfected infants. 7 ° Proponents of the bill argue, however,
that the benefit of early detection for uninfected newborns is that
mothers made aware of their own status will not postnatally infect
that child through contaminated breastmilk.171  This argument is
not persuasive. Although some studies have found the AIDS virus
in breastmilk, and although some health organizations advise HIV-
infected women not to breastfeed, 72 the medical data on transmis-
sion via breastmilk to non-infected children is inconclusive. 173
"Human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) has been detected
in breast milk by both culture and polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). However, this finding does not necessarily mean that
breastfeeding is a route of transmission."' 74  Transmission via
breastmilk was first reported in 1985 in Australia; over the next five
years, eight cases were reported, none in the United States. 75
Transmission may be more likely in postnatally infected mothers,
who would not be detected by newborn screening tests. 76 While
the CDC has recommended that women who are HIV-infected not
breastfeed, "the relative importance of breast-feeding as a route of
mother-to-child HIV-I transmission remains to be identified" and
should be weighed against the benefits of breastfeeding1 77 Irre-
spective of the unproven benefits of avoiding breastfeeding, the
need for forced testing and disclosure is further undermined by a
demonstrated willingness of women who choose to breastfeed to
170. See Field, supra note 32, at 427. Some aggressive treatment, particularly AZT
treatment, can be severely toxic "[t]hus, it is both dangerous and wholly without bene-
fit to those infants who are not infected but still test positive." Id.
171. This course of action is highly touted by Assemblywoman Mayersohn in her
advocacy of Bill No. 6747-B. See Mayersohn, supra note 76, at 1-2.
172. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 14. The New
York State Department of Health recommends that infected women be counseled not
to breastfeed. Id.
173. See, e.g., Richard E. Stiehm & Peter Vink, Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection by Breast-Feeding, 118 J. OF PEDIATRICS 410 (Mar. 1990).
174. D.T. Dunn et al., Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Transmission
Through Breastfeeding, 340 LANCET 585 (Sept. 1992).
175. Stiehm & Vink, supra note 173, at 410.
176. Dunn et al., supra note 174, at 585.
177. Martino et al., HIV-I Transmission Through Breast-Milk: Appraisal of Risk
According to Duration of Feeding, 6 AIDS INST. 991, 995 (June 3, 1993).
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submit to voluntary testing.178 There is no extensive data on the
subject, but at least one unpublished study has shown that women
in high-risk areas face numerous obstacles to breastfeeding and are
less likely to do so. 179 In addition, breastfeeding normally starts
immediately after birth, and yet normal test results are not avail-
able until several weeks after, thus negating their prophylactic pur-
pose for three-fourths of the positive newborns. If the usefulness
of not breastfeeding is uncertain, if few mothers in high-risk areas
tend to breastfeed, if those who do tend to breastfeed also tend to
agree to voluntary testing, and if those mothers for whom the re-
sults could make a difference do not receive them until after
breastfeeding has begun, then a primary rationale behind the bill is
substantially negated.
A third variable involves uncertainties of prophylactic treatment
for antibody-positive newborns in general. While the primary
medical advantages of early treatment are not disputed,180 there is
disagreement among primary caregivers as to when and how treat-
ment should be administered to positively tested newborns. While
some caregivers may treat every newborn who tests positive with
an aggressive course of prophylactic treatment, many will refrain
from acting on the basis of test results alone.1 8' These doctors,
although put on notice to the newborn's status, will nevertheless
hold off treatment of the asymptomatic infant until infection is cor-
roborated by a second source, such as symptomatic infection, docu-
mentation of actual infection, or a sufficiently low CD4 lymphocyte
count. 182 Thus, although the initial infant screening is useful for
putting the caregiver on notice and for prompting frequent immu-
nologic and virologic monitoring, primary acute care is predicated
178. See Kathleen Nolan, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, Women, and
Pregnancy, 17 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINICS OF N. AM. 651, 655 (Sept. 1990).
179. See Obstacles to Breastfeeding (Systems Approach to Nutrition for Children
(SANC) Study done at Columbia School of Public Health in Spring of 1992).
180. The most important treatment benefits arising from early detection are: (1)
prophylactic or retroviral therapy with AZT (Zidovudine) (to minimize the effects of
the virus on the various organs and systems of the body); (2) immunologic and viro-
logic monitoring (to alter immunization schedules and procedures so as not to provide
opportunities for infection, and to monitor and respond to changes in the infant's
health); (3) PCP prophylaxsis (to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the effects of
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, perhaps the most dangerous of the pediatric oppor-
tunistic HIV diseases); and (4) administration of intravenous immune globulin (to
bolster natural defenses). See, e.g., Mark Kleine et al., A National Survey on the Care
of Infants and Children with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 118 J. PEDIAT-
RICS 817, 820-21 (May 1991).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 820.
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not on testing but on reliable case-by-case confirmation.'8 3 Ethical
and medical uncertainties account for some of the hesitation in
pursuing an aggressive course of treatment solely on the basis of
newborn screening results. Acute care is inhibited by the percep-
tion that neonatal HIV infection is a fatal condition, and that even
optimal care cannot provide a cure.' 4 Treatment may ease some
symptoms, forestall or prevent opportunistic disease, or perhaps
only prolong a pain-filled life.' 85 For these and other reasons, ag-
gressive treatment is not always recommended by physicians. 186
Although less is known about treatment of infant infection than
adult infection, this gap is narrowing. As more is known about the
nature of vertical transmission, 187 as more accurate and faster diag-
nostic techniques are developed, and as more effective treatment is
perfected, the medical benefits of early detection will be more
likely to outweigh its intrusiveness. Today, however, the medical
advantages, when put in context, are significantly restricted.
e. Bill No. 6747-B Applies the Wrong Model
Bill No. 6747-B is conceptually and practically flawed by its ap-
plication of a traditional public health intervention solution to a
problem that does not fit a traditional public health intervention
model. 88 The lack of an immediate and dramatic treatment, the
impossibility of a definitive newborn diagnosis, the profound
stigma attached to AIDS, the absence of direct linkage to care, and
the inherent complications of early treatment' 89 make newborn
183. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 17 ("[Ilt ap-
pears that factors other than lack of knowledge of HIV status may also be responsible
for the fact that PCP prophylaxix is not available to all infected children.").
184. Betty Wolder Levin et al., Treatment Choice for Infants in the Neonatal Inten-
sive Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976, 2978 (1991).
185. Id.
186. Id. In one survey conducted in six neonatal intensive care units in New York
City, respondent physicians said that even if there were a definitive HIV test avail-
able, they would withhold treatment because an infected newborn's quality of life, is
so diminished by the pain and suffering which accompany infection. Other respon-
dents, however, said they would pursue an aggressive course of treatment even when
it was uncertain that the infant was infected, because (1) the infant could become
infected, (2) the infant could survive a long time without infection, (3) a better quality
of life could be achieved, and (4) life could be prolonged until a cure was found. Id.
187. See Altman, supra note 56, at Al; also discussed infra part VI.
188. See Nolan, supra note 178, at 656; Neonatal HIV Screening: Is Good Ethics
Bad Practice?, 1 PEDIATRIC AIDS AND HIV INFECTION: FETUS TO ADOLESCENT 71,
73 (1990) [hereinafter Good Ethics/Bad Practice].
189. It is impossible to ignore that HIV/AIDS is different from any other disease,
medically, socially, and even legally. See Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S. 2d 718, 722 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1988) ("While there is no consensus under what circumstance the ex-
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HIV screening radically unlike routine screening and intervention
for other treatable metabolic disorders such as PKU
(phenylketonuria), hyperthyroidism, or maple-syrup urine disease,
or treatable infectious diseases such as hepatitis B or syphilis.' 90
A traditional public health model such as mandatory vaccina-
tions of schoolchildren for certain communicable diseases' 91 is
based on an "infectious disease paradigm" in which health officials
identify a specific disease and take effective steps to prevent its
spread in the public.1 92 This model relies on the assumption that
the proven prevention of harm to oneself and others will find uni-
versal acceptance. 93 The intrusiveness of a public health model is
primarily justified by its ability to offer fast and effective treatment
and/or prevention. Mandatory testing and disclosure of parturient
women offers neither and "work[s] best in circumstances where
parents can be expected to be grateful for screening results that
cause little harm and at the same time allow obviously beneficial
interventions.' 94 Similarly, the public health model is "most easily
justified when safe and effective interventions to prevent disease
transmission are available and when the spread of the disease to a
large number of persons is expected.' 95 Newborn HIV screening
does not promise prevention, nor does it involve large numbers of
persons.
Distinguished from the traditional public health model are fam-
ily planning and genetics models concerned with parental responsi-
bility.' 96 As opposed to the emphatic mandate underlying the
public health model, family planning and genetic models lack a
clear intervention solution and therefore "emphasize individual
choice; the norms of promoting autonomy and 'value neutrality'
traordinary remedy [of] involuntary testing should take place, it is clear that the medi-
cal, psychosocial, and legal ramifications of such testing place it on an entirely different
plane than other, non-invasive or minimally invasive procedures.") (emphasis added).
190. Good Ethics/Bad Practice, supra note 188, at 73; see also Field, supra note 32,
at 427 (calling PKU "the paradigm for a procedure to which parents cannot effec-
tively withhold consent" and differentiating PKU from HIV screening).
191. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(9) (McKinney 1993) (mandatory vac-
cination of schoolchildren).
192. Nolan, supra note 178, at 656.
193. Id.
194. Good Ethics/Bad Practice, supra note 188, at 73 (emphasis added).
195. Nolan, supra note 178, at 656. In contrast, the genetic screening model "has
been adopted in situations where, despite heavy burdens from disease, effective inter-
ventions are lacking and the risk of transmission is relatively low, either in terms of
the risk to the individual or in terms of the total number of individuals likely to be
exposed." Id.
196. Id.
892
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reflect a respect for the ethical ambiguities generated by the deli-
cate array of competing values encountered.' 1 97 Because newborn
HIV screening is far closer to a family planning or genetics model
than the traditional public health model, its purpose is not well
served by a mandatory program.198
Finally, a public health model intervention does not rely on
ongoing, voluntary participation. Bill No. 6747-B, however, would
represent a meaningless intrusion if it failed to inspire serious long-
term cooperation.
f. Voluntary Cooperation is a Superior Alternative
When balancing the state interest advanced by a statute which
infringes on individual privacy, a court will consider the existence
of alternative, less intrusive means to the same end;199 when such
an alternative exists, it will weigh heavily against the state's choice
of the more restrictive statute.2 ° There is a clear alternative to
mandatory newborn screening which is both less invasive and more
likely to succeed: voluntary testing tied to peer counseling.
197. Id. Newborn screening is further distinguishable from traditional intervention
models in that it implicates the rights of the mother rather than those of the subject
actually tested.
198.. Nolan also argues in Good Ethics/Bad Practice, supra note 188, that HIV
screening of newborns is closer to the genetic model than the public health model.
The closest analogies for neonatal HIV screening would be screening for
such conditions as cystic fibrosis or sickle cell anemia, in which treatment
does not cure or correct the underlying conditions but may improve quality
of life or, in some instances diminish morbidity and mortality. It is worth
noting that only a few states have opted to conduct routine neonatal screen-
ing for these conditions, despite their severity, prevalence, and relatively
non-stigmatizing character.
Good Ethics/Bad Practice, supra note 188, at 73. Nolan concludes that,
[n]ecessity [of care], however, must be defined with reference to specific di-
agnostic and management needs of the individual children, not to a vague
desire to identify and thereby benefit all infants at risk. Until effective ther-
apies become available for asymptomatic HIV-infected children, early iden-
tification cannot be deemed essential, and involuntary approaches cannot be
justified.
Id. at 73; see also ROBERT ROOT-BERNSTEIN, RETHINKING AIDS: THE TRAGIC COST
OF PREMATURE CONSENSUS (1993). Root-Bernstein criticizes the medical establish-
ment's tunnel vision approach to HIV/AIDS research and calls instead for a new,
"multidisciplinary" approach that views AIDS as a social disease that cannot be un-
derstood purely in medical, biological, or laboratory terms.
199. See discussion of Wong Wai v. Williamson and other cases, supra notes 117-19
and accompanying text.
200. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Cullen v. Fliegner, 1994 WL 59923 (2d Cir. Feb. 28,
1994); Black v. Beame, 550 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
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The argument for voluntary screening is straightforward. In re-
moving Bill No. 6747-B's offense against privacy-there is no inva-
sion of the mother's right to confidentiality when she agrees to be
tested-a voluntary program simultaneously increases the likeli-
hood of improved care for the newborn. It does this by removing
the obstacles inherent in a mandatory approach. Soliciting in-
formed cooperation from the mother, through pre- and post-natal
counseling, reduces the likelihood of care avoidance,2 °' increases
the likelihood of cooperation with test results and follow-up care,
avoids alienation of the mother, and maximizes the likelihood of
positive, voluntary behavioral change. The mother who agrees to
be tested, who is adequately prepared to receive and respond ap-
propriately to her results, has already weighed the burdens of test-
ing against its benefits and chosen to pursue treatment should it
become necessary. A mother who cooperates with testing, who has
been prepared for a positive disclosure and educated on how to
respond, is more likely to engage in the behavioral modifications
needed to improve the lives of her child, herself, and her family.
Proponents of Bill No. 6747-B argue that the voluntary approach
has failed,20 2 but as Dr. Carolyn Britton, Co-Chair of the New York
State AIDS Advisory Council Subcommitteeon Newborn Screen-
ing, has perceptively noted, we must ask what "failure" means
before dismissing voluntary programs. Mandatory testing advo-
cates urge that failure means that only a small percentage of partu-
rient mothers submit voluntarily to testing.20 3 In fact, under the
current system, which does not even routinely encourage voluntary
testing,2°4 approximately one-half of all HIV-infected women al-
ready consent to testing.20 5 If active encouragement of testing
were pursued through peer counseling at all hospitals, the volun-
tary cooperation rate is likely to rise significantly.
In Harlem Hospital, for example, where a highly concentrated
at-risk population is served, voluntary counseling achieves cooper-
ation rates around 95%.206 This is an extraordinarily high and en-
couraging rate which exceeds even the most optimistic predictions
201. However, for those women who would avoid prenatal care regardless, the
presence of prenatal counseling would make no difference. It is estimated that 10%
of childbearing women receive no prenatal care. See Navarro, supra note 15, at A44.
202. Mayersohn, supra note 76, at 3 ("[T]here is no evidence that counseling and
voluntary testing initiatives have been successful.").
203. Id.
204. See Navarro, supra note 18, at B4.
205. See Navarro, supra note 15, at A44.
206. Id.
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for an involuntary system.2 °7 Unfortunately, and despite its suc-
cess, it is among the only fully-staffed, fully-funded programs in the
city. There is nothing to indicate that the Harlem program cannot
be duplicated, and the effort to do so could begin with increasing
staffing and funding in all hospitals and initiating a program of rou-
tine pre- and post-natal counseling that strongly encourages
testing.
Harlem's is not the only success story. Other sites indicate that
enhanced attention to education and pretest counseling result in
increased cooperation with screening efforts. A study done at the
Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore revealed that acceptance
rates for voluntary HIV testing were 96% in hospitals and 85% in
sexually transmitted disease clinics.2 °8 And there are other less
dramatic, relative successes. In one understaffed program at a ma-
jor inner-city hospital, seven counselors working with 50 pregnant
women a day achieved a 55% compliance rate, a figure matched by
17% of New York City hospitals.20 9 In another understaffed pro-
gram, 75-80% of parturient mothers were tested within three
months of delivery.210
The appeal of a mandatory approach is the promise of improved
care for all at-risk newborns. Unfortunately, Bill No. 6747-B's re-
sults would not keep pace with this promise. In contrast, the realis-
tic promise of voluntary testing, as Harlem Hospital's experience
indicates, is far more encouraging-without invading the mother's
privacy.
None of these considerations-discrimination, care avoidance,
no linkage to care, alienation of the mother, compromised early
identification benefits, wrong health model-could on its own
render Bill No. 6747-B unconstitutional, but cumulatively, and es-
pecially in light of the superior, less intrusive alternative of strongly
encouraged and counseled voluntary testing, they so undermine
the governmental purpose of the bill that it is clearly outweighed
by the individual burdens it would cause.
207. Because of the obstacles discussed in this part of the Note, 100% compliance is
not a realistic goal even in a compulsory scheme.
208. Thomas C. Quinn, Screening for HIV Infection-Benefits and Costs, NEw
ENG. J. MED. 486, 487-88 (Aug. 13, 1992). The latter figure represents a 20% increase
in a two-year period. Id. at 488.
209. Hearing of Newborn Screening Subcommittee, New York State AIDS Advisory
Council (Nov. 30, 1993) (Comments of Dr. Allan Rosenfield, Dean of Columbia
School of Public Health and Newborn Screening Committee member).
210. Hearing of Newborn Screening Subcommittee, New York State AIDS Advisory
Council (Nov. 8, 1993) (Comments of Dr. Kieth Krasinski, pediatrician and Newborn
Screening Committee member).
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B. Autonomy: Strict Scrutiny of Governmental Intrusion
As varied as governmental responses to HIV/AIDS have been,
Bill No. 6747-B is unique in that it alone is predicated entirely on
the occurrence of a discrete biological event, the birth of a child.
This perhaps is part of its political allure: infants are seen as the
most innocent and helpless, and least threatening, of HIV/AIDS
victims. But the fact that the proposed testing scheme is premised
on birth and the mother's decision to take her fetus to term has a
more significant legal meaning. Unlike other mandatory testing
schemes, Bill No. 6747-B implicates the second strand of privacy
identified in Whalen, namely autonomy, or "independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions." '211
This kind of privacy, which has also been called the right to self-
determination and is perhaps best characterized as a liberty,212 has
a rich and varied constitutional heritage. It has been rooted by the
Supreme Court in the First,213 Fourth and Fifth,2 14 and Ninth
Amendments, 215 and the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.21 6 To-
day, it is secured by the Court in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 21 7
Only those rights which are "fundamental" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" are included under the constitutional
guarantee of individual privacy.218 Fundamental rights are parsed
211. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. For a related study on the various factors that
influence the decision-making process of a pregnant HIV-positive woman choosing
whether to continue her pregnancy, see Kurth & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 122.
212. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), discussed infra part
IV.C.1.; see also, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
("This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
213. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
214. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967).
215. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
216. Id. at 484-85.
217. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether
it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions upon state action, as we feel it is . ) (emphasis added); see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
218. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, in his
influential concurrence in Griswold, argues that the justification for extending the
fundamental protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
beyond those rights explicitly assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights
is found in our tradition of adherence to those basic values "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," a concept originally enunciated by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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into several discrete "zones of privacy. ' 219 These zones include
marriage,220 procreation,221 contraception,222 family life,223 and
child rearing and education. 224 State action which infringes on self-
determination within these zones traditionally triggers the highest
level of constitutional review: strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny,
the legislation in question must use narrowly tailored means to
achieve a compelling state interest.225
1. Autonomy after Planned Parenthood v. Casey: A New
Standard?
In reviewing the constitutionality of state imposed restrictions on
access to abortion, 226 Planned Parenthood v. Casey227 altered the
interplay between strict scrutiny and autonomy. Like Roe v.
Wade,228 the seminal abortion case which Casey revisited and left
substantially intact,229 Casey lies squarely within the reproductive
rights zone of privacy. Unlike Roe, however, Casey did not apply
strict scrutiny review.230 The Court instead offered an updated for-
mulation of an "undue burden" test that had surfaced fleetingly,
and without majority support, in earlier decisions.231 The "undue
219. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
220. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978).
221. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
222. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1971) (White, J., concurring in
result).
223. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
224. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 532 (1925). For a reiteration of these protected zones, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
225. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
226. In Casey, the Court examined a Pennsylvania statute restricting access to abor-
tion through five preconditions; the informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period and
parental notice requirements were all upheld while the spousal consent and the rec-
ord-keeping requirement of spousal notice were struck as constituting an "undue bur-
den" on a woman's right to seek an abortion.
227. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
228. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
229. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 ("Our adoption of the undue burden test does not
disturb the central holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.").
230. The essence of Casey is contained in a plurality opinion signed by Justices
Souter, Kennedy and O'Connor and written by Justice O'Connor. The plurality re-
flects a compromise position between that faction of the Court that wished to keep
strict scrutiny as the level of review (Justices Blackmun and Stevens) and that faction
which wished to overturn Roe and reduce the level of scrutiny to that of rational
relationship (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas).
231. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 ("In our view the undue burden standard is the ap-
propriate means of reconciling the state's interest with the woman's constitutionally
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burden" test is a form of balancing that accommodates both per-
sonal liberty and important state interest by weighing one against
the other.232 As its factual touchstone, undue burden analysis asks
whether the government has placed a "substantial obstacle in the
path of a women seeking an abortion" of a pre-viable fetus.233
The extent of the change wrought by Casey has yet to be deter-
mined. The "undue burden" test may in practice apply only to in-
stances of state interference with the decision to terminate a
pregnancy, thus leaving strict scrutiny intact for all other funda-
mental rights review.3 On the other hand, "undue burden" may
emerge as the new, more flexible standard by which any interfer-
ence with individual autonomy is measured.235 Although commen-
tators have generally assumed that Casey is apropos only to
abortion-restrictive legislation,236 and although the lower courts
have yet to apply the undue burden analysis outside the issue of
protected liberty."); see also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-
74 (1977) (Roe protects the woman from "unduly burdensome" interference with her
freedom to decide); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (state may not impose
"undue burdens" upon a minor capable of informed consent); Doe. v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 198 (1973) (striking an abortion regulation that was "unduly burdensome").
232. Casey, 410 U.S. at 2821 ("An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of
law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.")
233. Id.
234. A restriction of "undue burden" to abortion cases is indicated by several fac-
tors, including: (1) the immediate concern of the Casey Court, and the sole issue
before it, was access to abortion services; (2) the plurality stresses in its opinion that
abortion is "unique to the human condition and so unique to the law", Casey, 112 S.
Ct. at 2807, not a representational one; (3) the plurality prefaces its argument, and
carefully circumscribes it, by noting "we find it imperative to review once more the
principles that define the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State
respecting the termination of pregnancies by abortion procedures." Id. at 2804; and
(4) the joint opinion stresses the special nature of the governmental interest in pro-
moting abortion.
235. Strong evidence supporting this position includes: (1) the plurality anchors its
opinion in a broad prefatory description of the evolution of liberty as a fundamental
right, id. at 2805, thus placing the decision to terminate a pregnancy squarely within
the substantive due process doctrine and alongside other protected areas of marriage,
procreation, contraception, and child birth; id. at 2804, (2) the plurality stresses the
"rational process" by which all fundamental rights are derived and the "reasoned
judgment" by which they are balanced against the State interest; id. at 2805; (3)"un-
due burden" is interpreted to be consistent with the Court's earlier jurisprudence of
liberty, id. 2818, and freedom of reproductive choice is linked to not only women's
autonomy but to gender equality as well; and (4) Roe, under review, is seen "not only
as the exemplar of Griswold liberty [freedom from unwarranted government intru-
sion] but of the rule ... of personal autonomy and bodily integrity." Id.
236. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1994); Kathryn Kolbert & David H.
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abortion,237 there have been no decisions which explicitly circum-
scribe Casey's undue burden balancing within the abortion context.
Under either test, Bill no, 6747-B cannot survive constitutional
review.
2. Strict Scrutiny is Fatal to Bill No. 6747-B
Under the strict scrutiny test, which requires that a compelling
state interest be achieved through narrowly tailored means,238 at
least three protected zones of privacy would be unconstitutionally
invaded by mandatory testing and disclosure of parturient women:
procreation, family life, and'child rearing.239
Strict scrutiny is fatal to Bill No. 6747-B because an alternative
means exists which is more narrowly tailored to the State purpose.
Voluntary testing tied to peer counseling avoids both the substan-
tial privacy invasion of mandatory screening and the built-in obsta-
cles (such as care avoidance, lack of follow-up care, alienation of
the mother) to improved care associated with it.240 The approach
proposed by Bill No. 6747-B can hardly be found "narrowly tai-
lored" when it applies a traditional public health solution to an is-
sue that does not raise traditional public health problems.241 As
discussed below, the mandatory screening is also grossly overinclu-
242sive. Furthermore, the purpose of the bill, improved care, is not
"compelling," insofar as current medical treatment, even if avail-
able to and accessed by tested mothers, cannot offer a cure for pe-
diatric AIDS or HIV infection.243
Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Establishing Neutrality Principles
in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1993).
237. The typical district court case relying on Casey applies undue burden reason-
ing to evaluate, as did the Casey Court, the restrictive provisions of a given state's
abortion statute to see if it placed a "substantial obstacle" in the path of women seek-
ing abortions in that state. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1339 (5th
Cir. 1993) (using Casey to uphold a Mississippi statute requiring two-parent consent
to an abortion by a minor but providing a judicial by-pass); Sojourner v. Edwards, 974
F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (using Casey to invalidate a Louisiana statute prohibiting
abortions except under extreme circumstance).
238. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Zablocki,
434 U.S. at 388; Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.") (citations omitted).
239. The nature of the intrusion into each of these zones is discussed infra part
IV.B.3.
240. See supra part IV.A.2.f.
241. See supra part IV.A.2.e.
242. See infra, notes 339-49 and accompanying text.
243. See supra part IV.A.2.d.
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3. Bill No. 6747-B Fails a Rigorous "Undue Burden" Analysis
In an expansive reading of Casey, State regulation of any consti-
tutionally protected zone of privacy would be subject to undue bur-
den review. A statute regulating one of these zones would be
unconstitutional only if it created an undue burden in the form of a
"substantial obstacle" placed between an individual and the consti-
tutionally protected zone of privacy in which she chooses to act.244
Undue burden analysis is essentially a balancing test which com-
pares the free exercise of a fundamental right or liberty interest
against the statutory effect of making the exercise of that funda-
mental right more difficult. As demonstrated in Casey, judging
whether a statute has the purpose or effect of creating a substantial
obstacle that makes it too difficult for an individual to act indepen-
dently is an empirically based, fact-intensive exercise. In judging
the multiple restrictions contained in the Pennsylvania statute,245
the Casey Court essentially inquired whether each restriction on its
own made it too difficult for a woman to choose abortion over
childbirth.246 As shown through a brief comparison of the Court's
analysis of two of the Pennsylvania restrictions, a twenty-four hour
waiting period and spousal consent, this empirical analysis requires
fine line-drawing.
The Court stressed the benefit and de-emphasized the burdens
of the twenty-four hour waiting period in finding that it did not
constitute a substantial obstacle. According to findings of fact
from the district court, the wait entailed increased costs and poten-
tial delays substantially longer than one day, as well as increased
opportunity for exposure to harassment from anti-abortion demon-
strators.247 These hardships were expected to fall most heavily on
those women with the least money, the farthest to travel, and the
most difficulty in explaining absences to husbands, employers, and
244. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
245. The statute at issue in Casey, the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982,
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990), stipulated five prerequisites for access to
abortions: (1) informed consent, (2) a twenty-four hour waiting period, (3) parental
consent for minors (with a judicial by-pass option), (4) spousal notice, and (5) report-
ing of abortion related information to the State by the facilities providing the service.
The statute allowed for exemption from these requirements in "medical emergen-
cies." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
246. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791. However, "[tihe Casey joint opinion manifests
distinct confusion over which party bears the burden to demonstrate or refute the fact
that the regulation poses a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right." Faigman,
supra note 236, at 688.
247. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
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others.248 The primary benefit of the wait, pinned by the Court to
the coattails of the statute's informed consent requirement, was
that it allowed for the time to make an informed and deliberate
choice. In light of the medical emergency exemption, the wait was
not considered to create a health risk.249 The Court also held that
earlier decisions justified State regulations which favored child
birth over abortion.250 In sum, the Court, having reasoned that the
wait did not make the right to choose too difficult to exercise, an-
nounced that "a particular burden is not of necessity a substantial
obstacle. ''251
In contrast, the Court minimized the benefits and stressed the
burdens imposed by the spousal notice requirement in finding that
it represented a substantial, and therefore unconstitutional, obsta-
cle to a woman's right to choose. The Court cited eighteen findings
of fact from the district court regarding the effect of the notice pro-
vision, all emanating from issues of marital abuse, wife battering,
and domestic violence.252 The Court even went beyond the factual
record to introduce studies in support of the lower court's conclu-
sion that fear of physical and psychological abuse would justifiably
deter abused women from notifying their husbands. Because there
was no exemption from the notice requirement for such women,
and because of the "millions of women in this country who are the
victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of
their husbands, 253 the provision was "likely to prevent a signifi-
cant number of women from obtaining an abortion. ' 254 The Court
held that spousal notice "does not merely make abortions a little
more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will im-
pose a substantial obstacle. '255
The outcome of an undue burden analysis of Bill No. 6747-B
would depend on how Casey is interpreted and applied by a lower
court, and on how it identifies and weighs the salient facts involved.
If the court follows Casey's more lenient language and analysis, as
was used for the twenty-four hour waiting period, the bill is likely
to be upheld. This approach would require focusing on the bill's
benefits-namely improved care for HIV-positive newborns-and
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2826-27.
253. Id. at 2828.
254. Id. at 2829.
255. Id.
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discounting its burdens. In its most lenient language, the Court
noted in upholding the record-keeping provision of the Penn-
sylvania statute that "it cannot be said that the requirements serve
no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult. '256 If ap-
plied in so obliging a fashion, undue burden analysis cannot invali-
date mandatory testing and disclosure to parturient mothers.
However, if Casey is applied more rigorously, a good argument
can be made that Bill No. 6747-B would not survive an undue bur-
den analysis. Several factors favor a more rigorous application: (1)
the difficulties that would be experienced by mothers under the bill
are not concerned merely with increased costs or inconvenience;
(2) the State interest at stake is not the unique interest in promot-
ing child birth, but the less compelling interest of improving health
care to children, three-fourths of whom are not in fact HIV-in-
fected; (3) the benefits promised by the bill are far more compro-
mised and far less concrete than the relative benefit to the State of
favoring child birth over abortion; and (4) the burdens implicit in
mandatory AIDS testing and disclosure-fear of physical suffering
and social discrimination- are similar to those "unfortunate yet
persisting conditions"2 57 -physical and psychological abuse-
which the Casey Court found so disturbing in striking down the
spousal notice requirement.
In discussing the bill's intrusion into the three zones of privacy
discussed below, this Note argues that the difficulties impressed on
women who are forced by the State to confront their HIV infection
and the possible infection of their newborns constitutes a "substan-
tial obstacle," and therefore an undue burden in their exercise of
autonomy in those constitutionally protected areas.
a. Burden on Reproductive Rights.
Under Bill No. 6747-B, every woman giving birth in a hospital
will be tested for HIV. Every woman giving birth in a hospital will
therefore be forced to add to her basic childbearing decision-mak-
ing process the separate issue of when and how to confront her
HIV status. Considering the physical implications heralded by a
positive test result (such as extreme weight loss, skin lesions, pro-
longed suffering, and death), and the profound discrimination
which follows AIDS, this new factor is undoubtedly a significant
burden on her decision-making. It would not be unreasonable for
256. Id. at 2833.
257. Id. at 2830.
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a woman to choose not to know her status, and the State's denial of
this choice would create a substantial obstacle in deciding when
and how to have a child.
For women in high-risk areas, mandatory newborn screening
represents a particularly burdensome intrusion.258 Childbearing in
these urban areas is frequently the culmination of strongly held
personal, family, social, religious, and ethical values which help de-
fine the individual and establish vital bonds to something beyond
the immediate landscape of poverty and despair.259 Imposing com-
pulsory HIV testing and disclosure on this self-defining moment
seriously complicates the would-be mother's decision-making.
Mandatory testing may present so substantial an obstacle to a
woman exercising her procreative rights that she avoids prenatal
and intrapartal care altogether rather than risk being exposed, a
pattern of care avoidance with serious health risks for both the
mother and child.2 °
b. Burden on Childrearing and Family Life
It is well-settled that the Constitution restricts the "State's right
to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood. '261 Within either zone, an individual is free to act au-
tonomously, without unjustified governmental interference. If en-
acted, Bill No. 6747-B would represent a serious incursion into
these two fundamental zones of privacy.
The vertical transmission of HIV from mother to child is first
and foremost a family health matter. The genealogy of the infec-
tion encompasses the entire nuclear family, and can be traced back
from the infant to its mother, and perhaps to its father as well.
Transmission, after all, occurs during the in utero development of a
new son or daughter and comes to light at the defining moment of
life and family: birth. After imposed disclosure, the infection of
the mother and possible infection of the newborn will cast the fam-
ily under the shadow of AIDS and its medical, economic, and so-
cial complications. A positive diagnosis would place unexpected,
substantial stresses on all facets of the family life. Among the se-
258. For many high-risk women, having children is an especially important passage.
See Weiss, supra note 29, at 670 (discussing in depth the cultural, social, religious,
economic, and personal realities of reproductive decision-making in this population).
259. See id. at 670-75. "[R]eproduction, babies, and motherhood serve as the only
means by which some women, especially poor, minority women, can achieve a sense
of self-identity, self-expression, and self-esteem." Id. at 673.
260. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
261. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
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vere immediate implications for the family are: partners made
aware of the infection may abandon or abuse the mother and child;
new economic, psychological, and social pressures will have to be
shouldered by often disadvantaged parents on top of already sub-
stantial problems; other children in the family may also be infected
with the AIDS virus; all members of the family may reasonably be
required to undertake voluntary behavioral change to minimize the
risk of transmission or exacerbation of existing infections; acute
care and supervision may be necessitated; and, perhaps most im-
portantly, the family is faced with the dilemma that their primary
care-giver, the mother, may soon be too sick to provide for the
family's needs and will eventually die.
The physical and social suffering are not conditions created by
the State, but that is not the focus of an undue burden analysis.
The focus is rather on the woman's ability to choose when and how
to have a child without that choice being made too difficult by gov-
ernmental intrusion. It may be that the factors foreshadowed by a
positive HIV test are exactly what a new mother or family would
want to know as early as possible.26 1 But it is equally reasonable,
given the unavailability of a cure for AIDS' attendant social and
physical ills, that the mother and family would prefer not to know,
or would at least prefer to become informed on their own terms.
In either case, the choice should be the mother's and the State cre-
ates an undue, and unconstitutional, burden when it removes that
choice.
The implications for child rearing are equally imposing. The an-
tibody-positive child will have her whole existence defined by her
medical status. The possible burdens on her life include: a regular
course of acute care both at home and at a hospital or treatment
center; an overwhelmed mother may give her up for adoption or
abandon her; schools, day care centers, neighbors, and family may
regard her with fear and suspicion. Because the mother may have
little control over most of these circumstance, her autonomy in
raising an HIV-positive child will be substantially burdened.
Under Bill No. 6747-B, the State co-opts a decision-making pro-
cess-when and how to confront a child's illness-normally left in
such circumstance to the parent(s). 63  In short, high-risk families
262. And in such cases, it might be assumed that these are the same women who,
once counseled, will voluntarily cooperate-with an HIV screening program.
263. In an enlightened discussion of mandatory prenatal testing in Martha Field,
Pregnancy and AIDS 52 MD. L. REV. 402 (1993), Field traces a continuous line of
liberty from Griswold through Roe, Casey, and Cruzan, arguing that these cases cre-
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already faced with steep obstacles and unprepared for this new
burden must confront an infection that is likely to become the focal
point of their lives. Such drastic modification will affect all aspects
of the family's daily life, including intra-family relationships and
relations with neighbors, schools, employers, insurers and land-
lords. The potential impact on child rearing and family life is
therefore tremendous.
The substantial obstacles to childrearing and family life created
by mandatory testing and screening of parturient mothers is not
justified by the State interests that would be advanced by Bill No.
6747-B. In Casey, the Pennsylvania statute involved "the State's
profound interest in potential life."" 6  New York's interest is not
profound by Casey standards. The state is not saving life or poten-
tial life; rather it is merely trying to bring better care to the small
percentage265 of infants exposed to HIV/AIDS-an incurable con-
dition. In addition, not only is improved care of positively tested
newborns hampered by its own internal uncertainties,266 but the
bill creates its own external barriers by spurring care avoidance
and failing to provide any linkage to follow-up care.267
ate an autonomous shield for reproductive, family, and medical matters that involve,
as the Court said in Casey, "intimate views with intimate variations [of] deep, per-
sonal character .... Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808. Field then argues that:
[a]s long as reasonable persons can differ as to the proper course of treat-
ment, the state should not intrude on the decisions of parents .... It is only
in extreme circumstances that government choice replaces parental choice.
Pediatric AIDS is a serious problem and needs to be combatted, but this fact
should not be used to make inroads upon our longstanding rules concerning
parental authority. Today the medical benefits deriving from testing are not
so compelling that a parental decision not to take the risks involved is an
abusive decision, warranting forcible displacement of parental authority
under prevailing principles of child abuse. Field, supra, at 431.
264. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
265. The median seroprevalence rate in New York is 0.599, meaning that less than
three-tenths of one percent of newborns are born HIV-positive. Newborn Screening
Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 7-8. Of these only one-fourth are actually
infected. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
266. See supra part IVA.2.d.
267. See supra parts IVA.2.a. & b. Furthermore, the undue burden of the bill is not
minimized by the fact that the vast majority of New York women will not be seriously
affected by it. As the Casey plurality noted in striking down Pennsylvania's spousal
notice requirement, "analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon
whom the statute operates; it begins there .... The proper focus of constitutional
inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law
is irrelevant." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829. In high-risk areas where mandatory testing
and disclosure will be an issue, a significant number of women will find it a substantial
obstacle to the autonomy that they are entitled to in matters of family, child rearing
and procreation.
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V. Equal Protection and Pregnancy Discrimination
Discrimination predicated on pregnancy for purposes of HIV
testing also constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.268 Although the Court has handed down several isolated
and controversial opinions that appear to disassociate pregnancy
and gender classifications, this slender line of cases has only a nar-
row application. Nothing in contemporary equal protection juris-
prudence precludes finding that a statutory seizure of pregnancy as
an occasion for compulsory HIV testing constitutes invidious gen-
der discrimination, subject to a heightened standard of judicial
scrutiny which it cannot survive.
A. The Supreme Court and Gender Discrimination
Departing from a restrictive common law tradition,269 the Court
in the 1970's formulated an "intermediate" level of scrutiny for
state action that discriminates on the basis of sex.270 Under inter-
mediate scrutiny, any such state action must be substantially re-
lated to an important governmental objective.271
Although intermediate scrutiny and undue burden analysis both
appear to fall between a rational relationship test and a strict scru-
tiny test, the two are conceptually, and in application, quite differ-
268. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o
state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
269. Justices regularly assented to the "archaic and overbroad generalizations" per-
petuated by opinions such as Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872). Justifying the denial of woman's right to attend law school,
Justice Bradley wrote that "[tihe natural and proper timidity and delicacy which be-
longs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life,"
and that "man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender .... This is the law
of the Creator." Id. at 141. In Thomas Jefferson's words, "[w]ere our state a pure
democracy there would still be excluded from our deliberations women, who, to pre-
vent deprivation of morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscuously in
gatherings of men." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973
and 1974 Terms, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1 n.5 [hereinafter Ginsburg I] (quoting
GRUBERG, WOMEN IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1968)); see also RUTH BADER GINS-
BURG, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (1974).
270. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Craig is discussed, infra notes 302-05; Reed
and Frontiero are discussed, infra notes 317-18. For the most recent Court discussion
of this line of cases, see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 62 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. April 19, 1994)
(No. 92-1239).
271. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 ("To withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.");
see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
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ent. Undue burden analysis is derived from the Due Process
Clause and concerns the right to privacy. It is triggered only when
a fundamental right is infringed by a state or federal regulation.
Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, is derived from the Equal
Protection Clause and thus concerns equal protection under the
law. It does not ordinarily implicate fundamental rights. In a bal-
ancing analysis dictated by an empirical weighing of the facts, the
undue burden test focuses on the degree to which the implicated
right has been made more difficult to exercise. If the difficulty en-
countered is great enough, it is considered a "substantial obstacle"
and therefore an "undue burden" on the individual.
All undue burdens are also unconstitutional. All gender classifi-
cations are not unconstitutional. Intermediate scrutiny, rather than
engaging in a balancing analysis, assumes that there has been a
statutory discrimination based on gender (i.e., a statutory restric-
tion applied only to women) and proceeds to assess whether that
classification is justified. Those that are justified will be allowed to
stand, those that are not will be invalidated. In order for a gender-
based classification to comport with the Constitution, strict scrutiny
requires that the State prove it to be "substantially related" to an
"important governmental interest."
Bill No. 6747-B lies at the intersection of gender discrimination
and pregnancy classifications, a hotly debated crossroads of con-
temporary constitutional law. The intersection defies easy analysis
because, in part, although only women can become pregnant, not
all women do so, and therefore a perfect correlation between preg-
nancy and gender is absent. Traditionally, debate at this crossroads
is antithetical: discrimination in the context of pregnancy is either
characterized as thinly veiled gender discrimination, and subject
therefore to intermediate scrutiny, or as an entirely distinct and
less objectionable classification subject merely to rational relation-
ship scrutiny.272 Pregnancy classifications, however, defy either
pre-set formula.
An alternative, case-by-case framework would provide that in
some cases such classification will constitute gender discrimination
and in others it will not. Whether intermediate scrutiny is triggered
272. See, e.g., Joanne Levine, Pregnancy and Sex-Based Discrimination in Employ-
ment: A Post-Aeillo Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 57-58 (1975) ("It is indisputable
that only women can become pregnant. To some, this makes it obvious that an em-
ployer's discrimination against pregnant employees is unlawfully based on gender. To
others, it is equally obvious that this makes job discrimination against pregnancy
wholly permissable.").
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will depend on the use of the pregnancy classification rather than
its mere existence. When this case-by-case approach is applied to
Bill No. 6747-B, it yields the conclusion that governmental isola-
tion of pregnancy as an occasion for compulsory testing and disclo-
sure is an invidious gender discrimination which fails intermediate
judicial scrutiny.
B. Overcoming Geduldig: When Pregnancy Discrimination is
not Gender Discrimination
1. The Peculiar Geduldig Analysis
The most commonly perceived obstacle to equating pregnancy
and gender discrimination is Geduldig v. Aiello.273 Decided twenty
years ago, Geduldig involved a challenge to California's disability
insurance program, which was designed to pay benefits to privately
employed persons temporarily unable to work due to a disability
not covered under workmen's compensation. 74 Participation in
the program was mandatory unless the employee was enrolled in a
private program approved by the state.2 75 Coverage was funded by
contributions of 1% of each participating employee's wages, de-
ducted directly from his or her salary. 76 Benefits were adminis-
tered by the state treasury from a special Unemployment
Compensation Disability trust fund. 77
Although the program provided coverage against disabilities
arising from a broad spectrum of mental and physical illnesses or
injuries, it expressly excluded coverage for any disability arising
from normal pregnancy.278 This exclusionary provision was chal-
lenged by four women who alleged that denial of coverage for their
pregnancy-related medical care constituted invidious discrimina-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause.279 The Court, in a 6-3 de-
273. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). This case represents the Court's first treatment of preg-
nancy discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause; in earlier cases, it had re-
fused to consider equal protection arguments and instead relied on due process
analysis. The Supreme Court has not faced an equal protection challenge to gender
discrimination based on pregnancy since Geduldig.
274. Id. at 486.
275. Id. at 487 (citing CAL. ANN. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3251-54 (West 1986)).
276. See CAL. ANN. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 984, 985,2901 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
277. Id. § 3001.
278. "In no case shall the term 'disability' or 'disabled' include any injury or illness
caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such preg-
nancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter." Id. § 2626
279. The district court had ruled that "the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties is not based upon a classification having a rational and substantial relationship to
a legitimate state purpose" and found that it was therefore unconstitutional under the
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cision, rejected the plaintiff's equal protection arguments and
declined to apply intermediate scrutiny.z0
Justice Stewart wrote the two-part opinion. The first part
stressed the success and efficiency of California's insurance pro-
gram,281 while the second argued that nothing in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause compelled the state to modify its program in order to
provide for more coverage than it currently allotted.282
The Court approvingly noted that the 1% contribution rate was
closely calibrated to the needs of the program, accounting for a
payout of between 90% and 103% of the disability fund annu-
ally.283 The program was thus efficiently structured "in terms of
the level of benefits and the risks insured, to maintain solvency of
the Disability Fund at a one-percent annual level of contribu-
tion."' The Court concluded that requiring California to pay ben-
efits for disability incurred during normal pregnancy would impose
a significant financial burden on the program.28 5
The Court next focused on whether the Equal Protection Clause
compelled that "such policies be sacrificed or compromised in or-
Equal Protection Clause. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 801 (N.D. Cal 1973),
rev'd sub nom., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In what may have signaled a
retreat from the position staked out in § 2626 of the CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE, the
California Court of Appeal, in a different action, found that § 2626 did not exclude
from coverage disability resulting from abnormal pregnancies. Rentzer v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604 (Ct. App. 1973). Section 2626
was subsequently amended to reflect this interpretation. CAL. ANN. UNEMP. INS.
CODE § 2626.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). Since three of the four women in the con-
solidated action where making claims for what the code classified as "abnormal"
pregnancy complications (ectopic and tubal pregnancy, miscarriage), their claims were
paid by the program, leaving the one woman who had experienced a normal preg-
nancy as the only plaintiff with a live controversy. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 488.
280. Although intermediate scrutiny was not formally articulated until two years
later in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), heightened scrutiny had already been
used by the Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973). See Ginsburg I, supra note 269, at 3-4; Megan R. Golden, When
Pregnancy Discrimination is Gender Discrimination: The Constitutionality of Exclud-
ing Pregnant Women From Drug Treatment Programs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1832, 1857
n.153 (1991).
281. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484-94.
282. Id. at 494-97.
283. Id. at 492.
284. Id. at 493 n.17. Governor Earl Warren's estimation of the program was influ-
ential on the Court: "It is not possible for employees to obtain from private insurance
companies protection against loss of wages or salary during sickness as adequately or
cheaply as that protection could be obtained by diverting their present 1% contribu-
tion for the support of a Disability Benefits Program." Id. at 493 n.16 (quoting CALI-
FORNIA SENATE JOURNAL, Jan. 23, 1946, at 229).
285. Estimates of the increased cost of including normal pregnancies as an insured
risk ranged from $48.9 million to $131 million. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 493 n.18.
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der to finance the payment of benefits to those whose disability is
attributable to normal pregnancy and delivery.12 6 Answering in
the negative-"California does not discriminate with respect to
persons or groups which are eligible for disability insurance protec-
tion under the program," 2 8 7 -the Court relied on its earlier deci-
sions in Williamson v. Lee Optical88 and Dandridge v. Williams.289
These cases essentially established that a state, so long as its legisla-
tive line-drawing was "rationally supportable," could address only
those aspects of a social welfare problem which it felt were most in
need of attention.290 The Geduldig Court found that California's
decision to insure some risks and not insure others was rationally
related to the legitimate purpose of "maintaining the self-support-
ing nature of its insurance program." '91
2. What Geduldig Means
Geduldig's holding is constrained externally by its subsequent
treatment from the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and Con-
gress, and internally by its own highly qualified language. In addi-
tion, Geduldig's constrained reasoning further reduces its value as
precedent; while carefully staking the narrow grounds on which a
pregnancy classification will not trigger Equal Protection Clause
protection, the Court indicates the wider field on which intermedi-
ate scrutiny will arise. It is into this wider field that Bill No. 6747-B
falls. Geduldig may make it more difficult to argue that pregnancy
discrimination constitutes gender discrimination, but it does not
stand for the proposition that pregnancy discrimination can never
constitute gender discrimination.
a. Geduldig's Reception
Geduldig's subsequent treatment from courts and commentators
has not been affirmative. First, it was an immediate and longstand-
ing target of vilification from legal scholars.2 92 Second, the
286. Id. at 494.
287. Id.
288. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
289. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
290. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495 (discussing Lee Optical and Dandridge); see Dan-
dridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87 ("[Tjhe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all.").
291. Geduldig, 471 U.S. at 494-95.
292. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 983 ("Criticizing Geduldig has since [19741 become a cottage industry").
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Supreme Court itself quickly squelched any expectation that
Geduldig signalled a general disassociation of pregnancy and gen-
der discrimination. In a 1975 per curiam opinion, Turner v. De-
partment of Employment Security,293  which addressed a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a Utah statute that excluded
pregnant women from unemployment compensation for an 18-
week period commencing 12 weeks before delivery, the Court re-
jected the State's argument that it was simply applying the same
rational cost-efficient decision-making as was used by the Califor-
nia program and rejected Geduldig as grounds to uphold the classi-
fication.294 Turner refused to apply Geduldig because the Utah
statute made "no mention of coverage limitations or insurance
principles central to [Geduldig v.] Aiello. ' 295
Even in the rare cases where Geduldig has been favorably cited,
as in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,296 its spare use
indicates a lack of vitality. In Bray, which held that antiabortion
protestors did not invidiously discriminate against women for pur-
poses of a Civil Rights Act provision concerning conspiracy to de-
prive a person or class of persons or equal protection,297 Geduldig
was cited only for the proposition that pregnancy distinctions are
not ipso facto gender classifications.298 This slim acknowledgement
from Justice Scalia in a case that produced five separately written
opinions did not extend Geduldig's narrow utility..
The circuit courts have similarly circumscribed Geduldig, leaving
it cordoned off from the mainstream of gender discrimination
cases.299  Perhaps most restrictive, although indirectly so, is the
Congressional response to Geduldig-like reasoning. The first and
only Supreme Court case to rely directly on Geduldig for its hold-
ing was General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.3"' In Gilbert, which was a
Title VI13°1 rather than a Constitutional case, Justice Rehnquist up-
held the disability plan of a private employer that provided all em-
293. 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
294. Id. at 45.
295. Id.
296. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); see also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (upholding against equal protection challenge a gender-neutral statute
which had an adverse affect on women because it was not overtly or covertly gender-
based nor did its adverse effects reflect invidious intent to discriminate against
women).
297. 42 U.S.C. § 1885(3).
298. Id. at 760.
299. See infra note 316.
300. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
301. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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ployees with non-occupational sickness and accident benefits but
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities.0 2 In response, Congress
quickly passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),
part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.303 The PDA pro-
hibits pregnancy discrimination in the workplace, stating that it
necessarily constitutes sex-based discrimination.3° In passing the
PDA, Congress directly refuted the reasoning used in Gilbert-
reasoning derived from Geduldig-by expressing the view that
"discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, dis-
crimination because of her sex. '30 5 In the Court's own words,
"[w]hen Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously ex-
pressed its disapproval of both the holding and reasoning of the
Court in the Gilbert decision. ' '306
Although Bill No. 6747-B is not employment related and would
not qualify for PDA analysis, the Court's own acknowledgement of
Congress' unmistakable rejection of its initial handling of preg-
nancy classifications is not without weight.
b. Geduldig's Language
Much of the attention, and derision, focused on Geduldig is not
directed at the text of the opinion, but at its controversial twentieth
footnote,30 7 in particular at the proposition therein that "[w]hile it
302. Id.
303. 92 Stat. 2076, amending Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
304. Id. § 2000e(k) ("women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related services ... as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ...").
305. Newport News & Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684
(1983); see also Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 791 n.29 ("Congress directly repudiated the logic
and result of Gilbert.").
306. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong.,
Sess., at 2 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-331, 95th Cong. Sess, at 2-3 (1977) (Congress in-
tended to adopt the view of the Gilbert dissent that pregnancy classification consti-
tutes gender discrimination).
307. The footnote reads as follows:
[T]his case is thus a far cry from cases like Reed and Frontiero, involving
discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance pro-
gram does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but
merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of com-
pensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant
it does not follow that every pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in Reed and Frontiero. Normal pregnancy is an objectively iden-
tifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing
that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an
invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation's such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
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is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow
that every pregnancy is a sex-based classification . .308
Although the curiously reasoned" 9 footnote is perceived as more
threatening than the text to an equal protection claim brought
against a pregnancy discrimination, its import is undercut by two
factors. First, it bears a tenuous logical relationship to the text of
the decision, a circumstance which at least minimizes its preceden-
tial weight.310 Second, it is repeatedly compromised by its highly
qualified language. For example, in acknowledging that "[w]hile it
is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-
based classification. ,,3 the Court signals that some pregnancy
classifications will trigger intermediate scrutiny. Similarly, by not-
ing that "lawmakers are free to include or exclude pregnancy from
the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis
"3. .,1,32 the Court acknowledges that some legislation which classi-
fies according to pregnancy-rather than on the basis of an effi-
cient insurance program-will constitute sexually discriminatory
legislation, and will thus be subject to intermediate scrutiny and
not merely a rational relationship test. Finally, addressing "[t]he
lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program . . ,, the Court concedes that its
refusal to equate pregnancy-based and gender-based discrimina-
respect to any other physical condition. The lack of identity between the
excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program be-
comes clear under the most cursory analysis. The program divides the po-
tential recipient into two groups - pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second group in-
cludes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the pro-
gram thus accrue to members of both sexes.
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-95 n.20 (citations omitted).
308. Id.
309. For example, against the proposition that pregnancy classifications inherently
discriminate against women because only women can become pregnant, Justice Stew-
art frames the proposition that pregnancy classifications merely create two groups:
"pregnant women and non-pregnant persons." Id. at 497 n.20.
310. The significance of footnote twenty has been seriously questioned by the
Court itself. See Newport News & Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
677 n.12 (1983) ("The principle emphasis in the test of the Geduldig opinion, unlike
the quoted footnote, was on the reasonableness of the State's cost justifications for the
classification in its insurance program.") (emphasis added). At least one commenta-
tor has suggested that the entire footnote could be considered dicta. See Levine,
supra note 272, at 72.
311. Geduldig, 417 U.S. 490-94 & n.20 (emphasis added).
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion is predicated on its economic analysis, and that different cir-
cumstance will produce a different result. These different
circumstance are provided by Bill No. 6747-B.
c. Geduldig's Peculiar Reasoning Does not Fit Bill No. 6747-B
With the exception of the narrow proposition for which it was
cited in Bray,314 Geduldig is closely tied to its facts. Its analysis of
pregnancy classifications and the discriminatory California legisla-
tion are entirely dependent upon the insurance program/social wel-
fare context in which it occurs.
The key to the Geduldig decision was the Court's ability to avoid
applying any type of heightened scrutiny to the challenged legisla-
tion. The Court applied the more permissive rational relationship
test to the California legislation because it was able to find that the
legislation did not classify according to sex. Rather, the Court
found, the legislation required only the more benign and more eas-
ily justifiable classification of what benefits the State would provide
to all persons alike, regardless of their status as pregnant women or
"non-pregnant persons." Under the California insurance program,
in other words, no one group was entitled to any benefits to which
any other group was not entitled. Men and nonpregnant women
did not get insurance coverage that was any different from the in-
surance coverage that was provided to pregnant women; both
groups were offered an identical package, and neither group was
offered coverage for normal pregnancy costs. The discriminatory
nature of the legislation applied not to persons but to the benefits
supplied to them, an economic distinction that avoided the animus
of group classification, by gender or otherwise. Having reasoned
that far, the Court quickly dispensed with the plaintiff's equal pro-
tection claim by blankly stating that "California does not discrimi-
nate with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for
disability insurance protection under this program. '315 Sharp as it
is, this is a short sword, its reach extending no further than the
economic context which forged it.316
314. See supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
315. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494.
316. See Justice Brennan's Geduldig dissent, in which he called the majority opin-
ion essentially a "cost-saving" decision. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); see also Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Geduldig, of course,
did not purport to establish that, as a matter of logic, a classification based on preg-
nancy is gender-neutral."). But Geduldig's limited application has been noted by the
full Court as well. See supra, notes 293-95 and accompanying text (discussing Turner)
and notes 305-06 (discussing Newport News). Federal Circuit Courts have also noted
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Ironically, Geduldig opens the door to an equal protection claim
arising, as Bill No. 6747-B would, in a different context. Justice
Stewart begins footnote 20 by noting that Geduldig is "a far cry
from cases like Reed v. Reed, and Frontiero v. Richardson, '31 7
cases that involved gender discrimination and triggered intermedi-
ate scrutiny. So long as the Court was able to distinguish Reed31 8
and Frontiero,1 9 which did not arise in an insurance program con-
text, it could avoid intermediate scrutiny. Bill No. 6747-B, how-
ever, unavoidably creates the same type of invidious gender
discrimination struck down in those two cases.
Unlike Geduldig, and like Reed and Frontiero, Bill No. 6747-B
creates a gender-based classification by imposing HIV testing and
disclosure on all parturient women. Its proposed testing scheme
involves no insurance plan or State allocation of economic benefits
with which to obscure this classification. In Geduldig, everyone re-
ceived equal access to an insurance program in which certain bene-
fits were offered and certain others were not; regardless of one's
status, the same benefits were available. Bill No. 6747-B repre-
sents the converse situation. Under its compulsory testing scheme,
the State does not distinguish between those benefits it offers and
the limited nature of Geduldig's holding and reasoning. See, e.g., Manufacturers Han-
over Trust Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 459, 466 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The Geduldig
Court upheld the [California] statute ... because 'the aggregate risk protection' pro-
vided by the statutory disability program did not disadvantage the class of women
compared to the class of men.") (citation omitted); Cook v. Arentzen, 14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1643, 1645 (4th Cir. 1977) ("[Geduldig] is an insurance case and
simply allows the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer's disa-
bility benefits plan.") (citation omitted); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 992 n.68
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("As we read [Geduldig and Gilbert], they do not condone sex dis-
crimination bottomed partly though not wholly on sex, or sex discrimination against
some but not all women. By the Court's appraisal, men and women were treated
equally in terms of protection conferred by the disability plans, and that led to the
view that there was no discrimination at all.") (emphasis added).
317. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20 (citations omitted); see supra note 307, for full
text of footnote 20.
318. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed was the Supreme Court's first use of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to invalidate a gender-based classification. The Court struck down an
Idaho statute that preferred men over women in appointing administrators for the
estates of persons who had died intestate.
319. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Frontiero crystallized the Court's use of intermediate
scrutiny for gender-based classifications. The plurality rejected an Oklahoma statute
allowing male members of the armed forces automatically to claim their wives as de-
pendents for purposes of collecting benefits, but requiring female members to prove
spousal dependency before receiving additional benefits. Id. at 678. The plurality
found that sex, like race, was based on a highly visible immutable characteristic that
was rarely relevant to performance, and had a long history of discrimination. Id. at
684.
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those it does not, but rather between those persons entitled to
"benefits" and those persons who are not. The analogous situation
under the California program would be if "nonpregnant persons"
received coverage for broken legs and pregnant women did not.
Both groups would not receive the same protection. That is the
same type of discrimination that Bill No. 6747-B would impose,
only the benefit denied to pregnant women would be the privacy
protection provided by Article 27-F of the New York Public Health
Laws. All persons in New York currently enjoy the confidentiality
and autonomy afforded by Article 27-F, but under Bill No. 6747-B,
the woman who becomes pregnant and decides to have her child is
denied that privacy. The pregnant woman would not, therefore,
have equal access to the same privileges enjoyed by nonpregnant
persons.
Although California's legislation could, however awkwardly, be
shoehorned into an insurance program context reviewable only
under the rational relationship test, Bill No. 6747-B cannot. The
result under the bill would be similar to that under a Tennessee
statute struck down by the Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty.32 °
The Tennessee statute stripped seniority from women returning to
work after pregnancy leave. The Court, in a Title VII analysis not
unlike that used in Equal Protection Clause cases, stated that "peti-
tioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that
men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a sub-
stantial burden that men need not suffer. The distinction between
benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics."32
1
The fact that not all women will be subject to the discriminatory
effect of the bill does not save it from heightened scrutiny.
Geduldig may stand for the proposition that the State is free to
reasonably exclude pregnancy-related services from its insurance
programs, but it does "not condone sex discrimination bottomed
partly though not wholly on sex, or sex discrimination against some
but not all women. ' 322 Unlike Geduldig, and like the discrimina-
tion in Reed and Frontiero, Bill No. 6747-B creates what Justice
Brennan called in his dissent a "double standard 3 23 in which "dis-
similar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical char-
320. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
321. Id. at 142.
322. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 992 n. 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
323. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501.
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acteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex
discrimination. 324
The peculiar reasoning of the Geduldig decision, narrowly
tethered to its insurance program context, cannot be stretched to
fit the far different circumstances proposed in Bill No. 6747-B. As
a form of pregnancy classification which constitutes gender dis-
crimination, Bill No. 6747-B will be subject to intermediate
scrutiny.
3. Light in the Tunnel: The Johnson Controls Decision
The Supreme Court's more recent decision in U.A.W. v. Johnson
Controls325 supports the conclusion that Bill No. 6747-B involves a
sex classification similar to those found unconstitutional in Reed
and Frontiero. Johnson Controls is useful because, although de-
cided under Title VII, it uses reasoning not unlike that employed
by the Court when gender classifications are challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 326
Johnson Controls, which did not directly address Geduldig, con-
sidered whether an employer could exclude fertile women from
certain jobs out of concern for the health of the fetus the woman
might conceive.327 The employer/respondent operated a battery
manufacturing plant. The primary ingredient in the manufacturing
process was lead, exposure to which involves substantial health
risks, including risk of harm to any fetus carried by female work-
ers.328 The manufacturer had instituted a policy forbidding all fer-
tile female employees from engaging in work at the plant that
risked exposing them to excessive levels of lead.329
324. Id. Feminist legal theorist Wendy Williams argues that it is not a double stan-
dard which prevents equal protection in such cases, but a single standard, and that
standard is male. Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, in MODERN CONSTrrUTIONAL THEORY: A READER, at 140
(John H. Garvey & T. Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 2d ed. 1991).
325. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
326. "Even though the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has no bearing on the
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it would be ludicrous for the
Court to recognize pregnancy based discrimination as sex discrimination in the work-
place, but not in other settings." Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the
Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.
J. 505 (Mar. 1992) (arguing that, in light of subsequent legislative and judicial deci-
sions and Geduldig notwithstanding, present policy behind statutes that restrict or
criminalize the behavior of women who use drugs during pregnancy constitutes un-
lawful gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
327. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 190.
328. Id. at 187.
329. Id. at 191.
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In addressing the class action that challenged the ban, the Court
held that the exclusion of fertile women, but not fertile men, from
lead-exposed jobs, created a facial classification based on gender
that explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of sex.33 °
The Court thus determined that a classification need not apply to
all women to constitute a facially discriminatory act of sex discrimi-
nation.331 Respondent's benevolent motives did not "convert a
facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discrimi-
natory effect. 332
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun provided a useful de-
vice for disentangling the lawfulness of pregnancy-related classifi-
cations. "Johnson Control's policy is not neutral," Blackmun wrote,
"because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the com-
pany's male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the
females. ' 33 3 Because pregnancy is a uniquely female experience,
its pertinence to governmental classification runs the risk of assum-
ing a priori a difference between men and women that automati-
cally justifies different treatment. Conceptualizing a classification
as predicated on "reproductive capacity" rather than "pregnancy,"
however, may free courts and legislators from that trap.334
330. Id. Respondent was unable to establish that sex in these circumstances was a
"bona fide occupational qualification" under Title VII. Id. at 199; cf. Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that a hiring policy preferring men
with school age children over women with school age children constituted sex discrim-
ination under Title VII that could only be justified by BFOQ).
331. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199. This case implicitly rejects the reasoning
used in Geduldig that relied on the existence of an excluded group of "nonpregnant
persons" that included men and women. Just as the statutory discrimination in John-
son Controls was not saved because it applied not to all women but only to fertile
women, thus excluding a group of "nonfertile persons" that included men and wo-
men, the classification of Bill No. 6747-B cannot be saved because it also excludes a
group-"non-parturient persons"-consisting of men and women.
332. Id.
333. Id. (emphasis added).
334. Part of the trap of seeing classifications in terms of pregnancy rather than re-
productive capacity is that the former is more easily associated with stereotypical gen-
eralizations and societal expectations about childbearing, childrearing, family, and
parenting. Because only women become pregnant and give birth, and therefore they
share a physical and emotional bond with the baby that a male cannot, there is a
different set of social norms pertaining to mothers' responsibilities to the baby. See
Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 545 ("ancient canards about the proper role of women"
and "characterizations about the proper domestic roles of the sexes" do not justify
discriminatory employment practices) (Marshall, J., concurring). The Supreme Court
has made it clear that moral and ethical concerns predicated on biological differences
are not an adequate basis for legal discriminations between men and women. "John-
son Controls' professed moral and ethical concerns about the welfare of the next gen-
eration do not suffice to establish a BFOQ (bona fide occupational qualification) of
female sterility. Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the
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Under a "reproductive capacity" framework, Bill No. 6747-B
constitutes a facially invidious discrimination based on sex because
it requires only women to avoid the full consequences of their re-
productive capacity if they wish to preserve their confidentiality
and autonomy against State intrusion. This proposal is a far cry
from Geduldig, in that women entering hospitals to give birth
would not seek legal protections beyond what is offered to "non-
pregnant persons," they would seek only to retain the rights they
walked into the hospital with, and that others capable of reproduc-
tion retain; in other words, they would seek only equal treatment
under the law.335
4. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to the New York Proposal
Under intermediate scrutiny, a party seeking to uphold a statute
that classifies on the basis of gender can do so "only by showing at
least that the classification serves important governmental objec-
tives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives. ' 336 The Court has
also interpreted this standard of review to place on the party seek-
ing to justify the statute the burden of showing an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for the classification.337
The importance of the state's given purpose-improved manage-
ment of HIV-infected or possibly HIV-infected newborns-is not
parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who
hire those parents." Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206.
335. The type of approach suggested by Johnson Controls and endorsed by this
Note has been called "substantive equality analysis" by one commentator. See Donna
M. Eansor, To Bespeak the Obvious: A Substantive Equality Analysis of Reproduction
and Equal Employment, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 417 (1992). Ean-
sor argues that because this more liberal approach is better suited to freeing legal
analysis from the distorting effect of stereotyping, biological determinism, nature the-
ory, and biased assumptions that has plagued "formal equality analysis" it has pro-
duced "results that are more equitable in nature." Id. at 421. Eansor sees an
emerging trend in cases like Johnson Controls to reject formal equality analysis be-
cause it is entrenched in biological determinism and perpetuates stereotyping of wo-
men. Id. at 422.
336. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723 (quoting Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150) (citations omitted).
337. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 373 (1993); Hogan, 458 U.S. at
724; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). It should also be noted here that at least a faction of
the Court believes that "it remains an open question whether classifications on the
basis of gender are inherently suspect." Harris, 114 S.Ct. at 373 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (citations omitted); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (O'Connor, J.); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975) (Blackmun, J.) ("We find it unnecessary in this case to decide
whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect."). If gender classifications
were to be found inherently suspect, then presumably, like other suspect classifica-
tions (race, national origin, alienage), would be subject to strict scrutiny review.
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disputed here: stopping the spread of pediatric AIDS surely quali-
fies as an important objective. Yet courts must not allow the obvi-
ous and urgent importance of this end to somehow compensate for
deficiencies in the chosen means.338 It is the means which must
receive the most careful attention.339
The most glaring failure of Bill No. 6747-B's means is its gross
overinclusiveness. Statistical analysis can be a critical tool for
means assessment, 340 and a persuasive argument can be made that
New York's numbers simply do not justify statewide testing of
pregnant women. There are approximately 1800 HIV-positive
births in New York each year (a rate which has remained flat for
several years), and yet Bill No. 6747-B requires statewide testing of
all of the more than 270,000 women who give birth in the state
annually. 341 Such statistical imbalance-nearly 100%342 of the
New York women who give birth will suffer a substantial intrusion
of their autonomy and confidentiality in an effort to guard against
a risk found in less than three-fifths of one percent of that popula-
tion 343 -would not survive the heightened scrutiny applied to gen-
der classifications.
In Craig v. Boren,3 " the Court relied heavily on a gross statisti-
cal imbalance to find that an Oklahoma drinking statute which al-
lowed the sale of "near beer" to women once they turned 18 but
not to men until they were 21 failed intermediate scrutiny.3 45 The
338. Nor will an ostensibly benign purpose excuse a sex-based discrimination.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
339. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944), a dissenting Justice
Jackson chastised the majority in that infamous opinion for allowing the compelling
end of national security to overshadow doubts about the dubious means of achieving
that goal and thereby creating a "principle that lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a claim of urgent need."
340. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-02 (using statistical analysis to strike
down a gender specific classification); see also Manufacturer Hanover Trust Co. v.
United States, 775 F.2d 459, 467 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Satisfying the substantial relation-
ship test will prove difficult to the extent that the gender classification is based on
statistical generalizations that are unreliable, that show only weak correlations, or that
are flawed in other ways."). If the numbers in New York do not justify statewide
testing, it is unlikely that any other state's will, since New York has the highest pro-
portion of HIV/AIDS cases in the nation.
341. See, NY Seroprevalence Project, supra note 12.
342. In 1988, the Seroprevalence Program reached 96.3% of all New York
newborns. Id. at 24.
343. Only .59% of the children born in New York test positive for HIV, meaning
that .59% of parturient mothers are HIV-infected. See supra note 69.
344. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
345. Id. at 457.
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Craig majority, citing earlier cases,346 held that "if maleness is to
serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must
be considered an unduly tenuous fit.134 7 In concurrence, Justice
Stevens noted that the statute failed intermediate scrutiny because
[t]he legislation imposes a restraint on 100% of the males in the
class allegedly because about 2% of them have probably vio-
lated one or more laws relating the consumption of alcoholic
beverages ... [even assuming that the legislation will achieve its
slight benefit], it does not seem to me that an insult to all of the
young men of the State can be justified by visiting the sins of the
2% on the 98%.348
The numbers in New York are even more extremely dispropor-
tionate than those in Craig. And they are further imbalanced
outside of New York City, in rural and upstate areas that report far
fewer HIV-positive births.349
The efficacy of the very program it seeks to replace further un-
dermines the fair and substantial relationship between newborn
screening and its purpose. The results of the current New York
State HIV Seroprevalence Project contraindicate a sweeping, state-
wide approach to controlling pediatric AIDS. There is no mystery
as to where pediatric AIDS is most likely to proliferate or where
infected neonates are going to be born. After six years of anony-
mous but demographically linked testing, the state knows exactly
who is at risk and where.350 Statewide testing is vastly overinclu-
sive, to the detriment of a group that has been historically disad-
vantaged by sweeping, paternalistic generalizations based on
gender.
There are numerous medical and policy reasons why compulsory
testing of parturient women is not substantially related to the goal
of improved care of antibody-positive babies. The first is that there
346. Id. at 459 n.13. Conjecturing from the facts in Reed, the Craig Court suggested
that premise that women lacked formal business experience would have to be proved
accurate in "substantially more than 2% of all cases." Id. In both Frontiero and
Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), mandatory dependency tests for men
but not women were rejected even though the Court recognized that there was less
likelihood that husbands would be dependent on their wives than vice versa. Craig,
429 U.S. at 459.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 685; see also Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 196, wherein the Court favor-
ably cited the Seventh Circuit's admonition that "[cloncerns about a tiny minority of
women cannot set the standard by which all are judged." 886 F.2d 871 (1989).
349. The seroprevalence rate in New York exclusive of the City is .17; in rural up-
state New York the rate in .07. NY Seroprevalence Project, supra note 12, at 16.
350. See supra part III.A.
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is absolutely no provision in Bill No. 6747-B for linkage to serv-
ices, 351 without which improved care is an illusory goal. The sec-
ond is that a compulsory, intrusive, and traumatic disclosure system
is prone to other mechanical deficiencies. These primarily include
an absence of pre-test counseling and a deficiency of post-disclo-
sure support services. Even if sufficient neonatal treatment facili-
ties were available in the areas that most need them, these
breakdowns are magnified by the profound personal and social
stigma which attach to an HIV-infection and diminish the likeli-
hood of cooperation with such a program.35 2 Third, there appears
to be a broad consensus among health care providers, obstetricians,
midwives, social workers, hospital administrators, community serv-
ices providers, nurses and others that the superior method for opti-
mizing care for HIV-infected newborns is voluntary testing.353 The
argument for voluntary testing posits that when such a program is
given a legitimate chance, in terms of staffing, training and funding,
it will produce high compliance rates, not only for testing but for
the follow-up care and behavioral change without which disclosure
is no more than one more piece of bad news in lives that are too
often physically and emotionally impoverished from want of good
news.
V. An Alternative to Bill No. 6747-B
The constitutional, medical, and policy deficiencies of Bill No.
6747-B do not leave New York without a viable option to fight the
spread of pediatric AIDS. Two steps are necessary to reach this
goal: (1) maximizing the number of mothers tested and informed
of their results, and (2) maximizing the number of infected mothers
and infants who then receive improved care, including both medi-
cal treatment and supportive social services. These integral goals
are best served by a two-tiered approach in which HIV counseling
is made mandatory and voluntary testing is strongly encouraged.
Mandatory counseling should become part of the standard oper-
ating procedure of all health care providers in contact with preg-
nant women at any stage of their pregnancy, including post-partum
if testing has not yet occurred. Counseling should be engrained
and encouraged at all levels, from hospital and care center adminis-
trators to primary caregivers to paraprofessionals to community
leaders. Educators should also join the effort, both school teachers
351. See supra part IV.A.2.a.
352. See supra part IV.A.3., IV.B.3.a. & b.
353. See supra part IV.A.2.f.
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of pregnant adolescents and graduate teachers of tomorrow's care
providers. The presence of a counseling apparatus alone is not
enough. Counseling should be culturally and linguistically appro-
priate, non-threatening, focused on family needs, accessible; coun-
selors should be well-trained and fully informed about current and
community issues.
Counseling becomes even more important with the recent an-
nouncement that AZT can prevent the vertical transmission of
HIV from mother to child.3" 4 Surely, this is the most welcome
news of all since blocking vertical transmission will virtually elimi-
nate new cases of pediatric AIDS. If this breakthrough study
proves as successful as its early results indicate 355 (and this success
as yet falls far short of blocking all vertical transmission 356), the
debate about the efficacy of various prophylactic and therapeutic
treatments, and when and how to initiate them, will be mooted. As
early as possible in their pregnancy, mothers should be counseled
on the risks of transmission and the availablity and effectiveness of
AZT. Although the primary means of treatment, or rather preven-
tion, will have been clarified, a new debate will arise that focuses
on prenatal rather than post-natal testing. If AZT blocks vertical
transmission, and if at-risk babies can therefore be definitively
spared infection, should prenatal testing be made mandatory?
And, if maternal testing is made mandatory, and positive results
are returned, should taking AZT also be mandatory? With a
proven solution to in utero transmission, the state will have a more
compelling argument to override the mother's rights than it does
now, but whether that will be sufficient to overcome countervailing
confidentiality, autonomy, and equal protection arguments is
unclear.
Even in the absence of a proven in utero solution, the AZT an-
nouncement has already spurred legislative action. As of the time
this Note was completed, New York State Senator Michael J. Tully,
354. Lawrence K. Altman, In Major Finding, Drug Curbs H.LV. Infection in
Newborns, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at Al.
355. In the study, conducted jointly in the United States and France, 26% of
newborns whose HIV-infected mothers received placebos during their pregnancies
were themselves infected; among newborns whose mothers received AZT, only 8%
were infected. Id. at A13.
356. For example, the women in the test group all had a minimum number of CD4
cells and none of them had taken AZT previously. In addition, AZT was first given
to these women during pregnancy, second through an infusion at delivery, and third
to the newborn at delivery. Nevertheless, transmission was not blocked in all cases.
In addition, it is not clear just which aspect of the test, or which combination, pre-
vented transmission.
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Jr., had recently proposed an alternative to Bill No. 6747-B. 57
Senate Bill No. 6775,358 focusing on voluntary cooperation with
prenatal detection and prevention, has the dual purpose of facili-
tating early treatment of HIV-infection in pregnant women and re-
ducing the rate of vertical transmission. 35 9 To do so, the bill would
mandate that all expectant mothers be counseled about the risks of
HIV transmission and the availability and benefits of HIV testing
as part of their standard prenatal care. For most mothers, counsel-
ing would occur at their first prenatal visit; for those who do not
seek prenatal care, it would occur after delivery and prior to dis-
charge. A second element of the Tully proposal360 would require
the State to develop "an educational booklet that prenatal care
providers will use in providing information about the health bene-
fits of early HIV testing to their patients."' 361 Such booklets would
include an explanation of the confidentiality provisions of Article
27-F. In coupling a voluntary approach with routine counseling
about the benefits of early testing and disclosure, the Tully propo-
sal resembles the recommendations made by this Note and the
Newborn Screening Committee Report.362
In the effort to save the infant, under any scenario, the mother
and the family should not be forgotten. The fundamental link be-
tween child and mother must not be severed, because regardless of
how the unfortunate transfer of HIV from mother to child oc-
curred, and regardless of the ease with which we can isolate and
blame the mother, an intervention which severs the family unit sev-
ers its own chance of success. Under no circumstances should
pregnancy become an opportunity for the state to manipulate a wo-
man's procreative choices. On the contrary, any initiative which
isolates, blames, or otherwise unnecessarily burdens the mother
should be avoided. The mother must be respected and encouraged
as the key to her infant's health.
Expansion of counseling and testing will necessitate increased
funding. This funding should be allocated to both improved treat-
ment (diagnostic procedures which shorten the testing process and
357. See Sack, supra note 18, at B5.
358. New York Senate Bill proposal No. 6775 was presented to the Senate on Feb-
ruary 24, 1994.
359. See New York State Introducer's Memorandum in Support of Senate Bill No.
6775 [hereinafter Introducer's Memo].
360. The bill is co-sponsored by Assemblyman Richard N. Gottfried. Id.
361. See id.
362. See Newborn Screening Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 39-43. On
April 14, 1994, the Tilly bill passed the Senate in a 50-1 vote.
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increase its accuracy and medical procedures which improve pro-
phylaxis and therapeutic techniques) and to improved social sup-
port services (continuing counselor training attuned to the
complexities of living with HIV/AIDS is the inner city). When
mandatory counseling and strongly encouraged testing are put in
place, they must not be regarded as a solution in an of themselves.
Testing results must be returned as soon as possible to maximize
their usefulness, an efficient and humane disclosure procedure
must be exercised, and direct linkage to care-especially through
"co-location" 363
-must be facilitated. Co-location, which clusters
the multiple medical and social services required by a family in-
fected with HIV, is a realistic, thoughtful response to pediatric
AIDS that looks beyond the expediency of identification to the ur-
gency of treatment.364
Finally, in conjunction with any alternative solution to pediatric
AIDS, the current seroprevalence testing program should be re-
evaluated to determine whether it has fulfilled its purpose and out-
lived its usefulness, whether it is still an effective tool for epidemio-
logical research, or whether it can be modified to serve the integral
goals discussed here.365
VI. Conclusion
Pediatric AIDS is a fitting and tragic emblem for the HIV/AIDS
crisis from which it sprang. The concentration in an infant of the
physical and social suffering which accompany HIV infection not
only demonstrates dramatically the changing demographic profile
of the AIDS epidemic, it also provides an opportunity to test our
social resolve and fairness-as well as our medical ingenuity-in
dealing with this deadly disease. Bill No. 6747-B reflects the folly
363. See id. at 21.
364. Id.
365. Bill No. 6747-B would use New York's current seroprevalence testing program
as a springboard for mandatory testing. Families would be better served if, instead, a
mechanism were put in place that gives mothers who have just delivered a final option
of learning the results acquired by current unlinked testing. This would require that
the program be altered so as to allow for results to be linked, such as by adding a new
function to the computerized process by which identifying data is stripped from blood
samples (perhaps the randomly-generated number that is currently assigned to both
the test results and the demographic identifiers could be reassigned to personal identi-
fiers as well). The integrity of the current program could thus be maintained while
allowing care providers present at the birth or immediately thereafter to inform the
mother that this test is being done and ask if she would like to receive the results for
the benefit of her child. The timing of this option, which should not be made coercive,
after the mother has completed her delivery and begun her role as caregiver may well
elicit a high rate of cooperation.
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of attempting an expedient, one-dimensional legal solution to this
complex problem. The bill's failure to withstand constitutional
scrutiny is hastened by its inattentiveness to the medical and social
realities of AIDS.
A vote against Bill No. 6747-B is not a vote against improved
care for HIV-positive newborns. Rather, a fully-informed vote
against the bill should send two important messages. The first is
that the New York Assembly will not unnecessarily compromise
fundamental constitutional principles-such as privacy and equal
protection of the law-in order to give the appearance of doing
something about AIDS.
Second, a vote against the bill should be translated into a vote
for an alternative solution. The energy, publicity, and concern
sparked by the bill should not be wasted. In the debate that sur-
rounded its proposal, many good ideas came forward. These ideas
should be developed into an alternative proposal that avoids a
mandatory testing scheme and its inherent invasion of the mother's
right to confidentiality, autonomy, and equal protection. Whereas
these invasions under Bill No. 6747-B could not be justified in the
absence of a significant benefit to the infected infant, a voluntary,
peer-counseled approach closely linked to follow up care will offer
greater hope to the children of HIV-positive women. All future
legislative action should be attuned to the recently discovered abil-
ity of AZT to block vertical transmission altogether, thus
recharacterizing, but not resolving, the legal and social complexi-
ties of treating pediatric AIDS.
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